published on February 2, 2024

Is Judith Butler¡¯s Rejection of Liberal Individualism Compatible with a Relational Understanding of Autonomy?

This essay develops a renewed conception of autonomy through an explication of Judith Butler¡¯s critique of liberal individualism in The Force of Nonviolence. I argue that while rejecting liberal individualism requires abandoning the fantasies of mastery and self-sufficiency, such a rejection need not imply a renunciation of autonomy. Instead, an ethics of nonviolence that is committed to equality demands a relational understanding of autonomy that affirms our radical interdependency. I contend, moreover, that for an account of the self to acknowledge this interdependency, the body must be conceived as a threshold rather than an end. Put differently, to be a relational self means to be given over to others from the start. My argument proceeds in three steps. First, I explore Butler¡¯s critical analysis of liberal political thought, while emphasizing the key role that the state-of-nature fantasy plays in the Western social and political imaginary. Next, I show how dependency, interdependency, and vulnerability are closely related but also distinct. Specifically, I argue that a relational understanding of autonomy is consistent with Butler¡¯s emphasis on our interdependency and the social obligations that bind us to one another. Finally, I show how the social model of disability lends further support to a relational understanding of autonomy. Drawing on Butler¡¯s brief discussion of instruments for support in The Force of Nonviolence, I propose that we think more closely about the everyday ways in which we are sustained by various modes of support. The fact that we never stop relying on this support, even when we disavow it, suggests that autonomy is not a given but rather an achievement.