ONLINE FIRST
published on March 10, 2022
Michal Kar?a
https://doi.org/10.5840/ajs20223976
On Peirce¡¯s Earliest Conception of Metaphysics
In this paper, I explore Peirce¡¯s initial conception of metaphysics as developed in his ¡°Treatise on Metaphysics¡± (1861¨C2: W 1.57¨C84). Peirce claimed therein that the idea of metaphysics was three-fold, with its three perspectives consisting of its definition, object, and method. Since Peirce defined metaphysics as the ¡°philosophy of primal truths¡± (1861: W 1.59), I initially focus on elaborating upon what these ¡°primal truths¡± are and illustrate that they are analytical propositions resulting from the logical analysis of the general constitution of a mental state (an image) to its elements. Next, I give account of how Peirce¡¯s thoughts regarding the justification of metaphysical propositions resulted in his concluding that in metaphysical knowledge, like in any other, there is an element of faith. Finally, I conclude with remarks regarding Peirce¡¯s notion of reflexivity as it is employed in his metametaphysics.