ONLINE FIRST
published on November 16, 2023
Jonathan Fuqua
https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq20231114213
Proper Functionalism, Perfectionism, and the Epistemic Value Problem
The epistemic value problem¡ªthat of explaining why knowledge is valuable, and in particular why it is more valuable than lesser epistemic standings, such as true
belief¡ªremains unsolved. Here, I argue that this problem can be solved by combining proper functionalism about knowledge with perfectionism about goodness. I begin by laying out the epistemic value problem and the extant challenges to solving it. I then proceed to begin solving the problem by explicating a broad and ecumenical form of proper functionalism. I finish solving the problem by introducing the perfectionist theory of value and then showing how that theory of goodness, in tandem with proper functionalism, solves the epistemic value problem.