Volume 64, Issue 2, June 2024
Evan Dutmer
Pages 111-126
https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq202534246
A Neo-Augustinian Deception-Based Account of Lying
There has been much scholarly discussion regarding the supposed inadequacies of the traditional account of lying, the general form of which can be seen in Augustine¡¯s De mendacio (On Lying), 3¨C4. This account, stated simply, is that a subject S lies if and only if S says something that S believes to be false, and S says that with the intent to deceive another. But recent contributions to the philosophy of lying press our intuitions on this final condition. They point to counterexamples which seem to show that the intention to deceive clause is not a necessary condition for lying. If correct, this would drastically change our understanding of lying, and it would perhaps make it more difficult to see the moral wrongness of different types of lying. Contrary to this trend, Jennifer Lackey, in her essay, ¡°Lying and Deception: An Unhappy Divorce¡± (2013) brings deception back into our account of lying. Her essay serves as a prominent example of a ¡°Deceptionist¡± account of lying. In this essay, I shall first outline my own view, which I¡¯ve called ¡°Neo-Augustinian,¡± but which also builds on some of Lackey¡¯s interventions. I then further motivate Lackey¡¯s moves by looking at the three main types of lies that are used as counterexamples to the traditional account and show that they are unsuccessful for both Lackey¡¯s account and mine. I shall then turn to a consideration and extended discussion of my own definition of lying through such examples. My Neo-Augustinian, Lackey-style account will be seen to best handle these difficult examples, retrieve the intuitive moral wrongness of lying, and vindicate important elements of Augustine¡¯s original analysis of lying in the De mendacio. Nevertheless, my account does not require adopting Augustine¡¯s absolutism regarding lies; hence, it is importantly Neo-Augustinian rather than strictly Augustinian.