Volume 33, Issue 1/2, 2021
Timothy Hinton

Pages 3-25
https://doi.org/10.5840/philtheol2023221151
Is Aquinas¡¯s Doctrine of Analogy Really Unintelligible?
Thomas Williams maintains that the doctrine of analogy is unintelligible. In this paper, I scrutinize and reject Williams¡¯s argument for that claim insofar as it applies to Thomas Aquinas¡¯s particular version of the doctrine. After laying out Williams¡¯s critique, I present an account of Aquinas¡¯s conception of analogy. I identify three components of it: a semantic part, a metaphysical part, and a distinctive conception of inference. I briefly explain how all three of these components play a role in Aquinas¡¯s philosophical theology. On the basis of these ideas, I proceed to demonstrate how Williams¡¯s argument against analogy, understood as a set of reasons for rejecting Aquinas¡¯s version of it, fails completely. I end by pointing out how hard it appears for anyone who rejects the doctrine of analogy to keep faith with the idea of creation ex nihilo.