ONLINE FIRST
published on February 1, 2022
Samantha L. Fritz
https://doi.org/10.5840/tej2022131103
Removing Disability in Children: An Essay on Barnes¡¯s The Minority Body
In this paper, I respond to one aspect of Elizabeth Barnes¡¯s argument in The Minority Body: a Theory of Disability. To do this, I first explain her argument as it applies towards children: in order to have a genuine ¡°mere-difference¡± view of disability, one may not cause nor remove disability. The consequence of this theory is that it is impermissible for parents to choose to remove their child¡¯s disability. I argue this is incorrect. Barnes¡¯s assumption relies on a non-interference framework, which is inappropriate when applied to children. When we use an interest-protection framework instead, it becomes at least permissible for parents, and in some situations obligatory, to choose to remove their child¡¯s disability. Because the permissibility or obligation is situationally dependent, this view is consistent with Barnes¡¯s overall argument for the mere-difference view of disability.