Volume 11, Issue 2, June 2022
Daniel Coren

Pages 114-121
https://doi.org/10.5840/tht20233814
Willpower and Well-Being
How is willpower possible? Which desires are relevant to well-being? Despite a surge of interest in both questions, recent philosophical discussions have not connected them. I connect them here. In particular, the puzzle of synchronic self-control says that synchronic self-control requires a contradiction, namely, wanting not to do what we most want to do. Three responses have been developed: Sripada¡¯s divided mind view, Mele¡¯s motivational shift thesis, and Kennett and Smith¡¯s non-actional approach. These responses do not incorporate distinctions from desire-satisfaction theories of well-being. I argue that distinguishing between behavioural desires and genuine-attraction desires disarms one objection to synchronic self-control. Conversely, disarming that objection salvages an axiologically crucial claim in recent versions of desire-satisfaction theory.