This article draws on Augustine＊s De trinitate to articulate a logic of fallibilist commitment. It speaks into the wider context of twenty-first century religious pluralism, focusing as a test case on Christian post-supersessionism, in which the problem of fallible commitment emerges for the Christian who seeks, in response to her Jewish co-traditionalists, to repair her own tradition in respect of its long-entrenched supersessionism (the family of claims and practices rooted in the belief that the church has replaced Israel in the purposes of God). With a focus on the work of R. Kendall Soulen, I argue that postliberal post-supersessionist Christian theology is both exemplary in the way it enacts fallibilist commitment and falls short of a more thoroughgoing fallibilism. After tracing the fallibilist commitment, or logic of searching, articulated and enacted by Augustine in response to the questions he poses in De trinitate 10, I return to postliberal post-supersessionism in order to follow through more fully its partial repair of supersessionist Christianity.

In Confessiones 6.14.24, Augustine describes a dream for living in community with his male friends. Although this particular community never came to fruition, Augustine continued to promote the idea of gendered communities and lived his later years surrounded by men. His biographer and friend Possidius even makes a point of noting that as bishop Augustine was stringent about never being alone with a woman. In this paper I examine Augustine＊s Confessiones alongside De Genesi ad litteram to consider why Augustine prefers gendered communities, what he thinks necessitates them, and what potentially misogynistic thinking might be underlying his thought. I suggest that Augustine＊s reasoning for gendered communities privileges men＊s struggles with chastity over women＊s opportunities and treats women as temptresses. I conclude by arguing we should listen to women as we reconsider the usefulness and desirability of creating communities along gendered lines.

Augustine＊s theology of divine forgiveness has received surprisingly little sustained attention. This is unfortunate, not least because his approach offers a thought-provoking contrast to the way forgiveness is typically conceived in our own day. We commonly understand forgiveness in therapeutic terms, as overcoming resentment or anger. For Augustine, God＊s forgiveness is ※metaphysical§〞an other-oriented action that changes the moral and spiritual status of those who are forgiven. God forgives preveniently, to free sinners from their sin, so that they can be who they were meant to be. Forgiveness, therefore, is a divine attempt to restore sinners to the good. Yet although God acts out of love, Augustine did not consider forgiveness incompatible with paternalistic anger or punishment. This essay draws on Augustine＊s theologies of baptism and the cross to explore these ideas, and their implications for the relationship between human and divine agency in giving and receiving forgiveness. It concludes by raising some questions about how Christians should think about human forgiveness in light of Augustine＊s account of God＊s transformative love.

This essay makes three points. First, in his work Augustine sought to craft something like what Theodor Adorno called a ※late style§〞a style achieved after maturity has been realized, when a thinker or artist finds their work frustrated by the received cultural expectations, and they seek to overcome those expectations. So understood, a ※late style§ expresses both frustration and hope. However, second, Augustine＊s late style differs from Adorno＊s Romantic aesthetics, in both content and form, and usefully illuminates his overall project: It explains his repeated troubling of his own acts of writing and his culture＊s practices of reading, and what reading was expected to produce in its practitioners. Across his whole career he struggled, increasingly self-consciously, against his culture＊s formal expectations about authoritative teachings, and its material fantasy of a straightforwardly successful life. He attempted instead to communicate both his own flawed and ongoing path, and the inevitable difficulty and frustrations of post-lapsarian life, as he understood the Christian faith to depict it. The final manifestation of his late style is found in the City of God, where it produces a mode of writing, and a picture of the wayfaring Christian, capable of both skeptical critique, confessional affirmation, lively compassion, and humble gratitude. Third, recognizing and appreciating Augustine＊s late style can provoke us to our benefit, in facing the challenges of religious life today, both as individuals and as people seeking to live together for the common good.

Augustine can appear to be a rigidly dogmatic writer and thinker〞he is responsible for defining much of what becomes orthodox dogma against positions he vigorously labels heretical. But he is too honest and too poetic a thinker to be so simple. His reading of original sin, a concept whose importance is largely his doing, is often understood as not only unambiguous but strongly misogynistic. This paper suggests that it is neither. It draws especially on two sources. The first is a letter to a young monk, in which Augustine urges that the monk〞and perhaps implicitly all devout men〞should avoid Eve in all women, but specifically in the figures of mother and wife. The second is the Confessions. Here three feminine figures〞Augustine＊s mother, Monica; his unnamed partner/wife; and the enticing Lady Continence〞all complicate any negative imagery. A series of heartbreaks emerges. It begins, in a way, with Eve＊s creation out of Adam＊s side; it extends to the exile consequent upon original sin; it goes on to Monica＊s death and the unnamed woman＊s banishment. But Continence, who turns Augustine to God, strongly echoes both these women, and arguably is not possible without them〞not just as women, but specifically as mother and wife. Heartbreak and heart-mending, absence and God, turn out to be inextricably interwoven.

Point of departure is the way post-modern philosophers such as Judith Butler and Giorgio Agamben have theorized the calamity of 9/11. What comes to the fore is a Carl Schmitt-like preoccupation with foundational notions like Setzung -notions that in their turn are embedded in a web of negativity, culminating in the sovereign status, for good or for ill, of the state of exception. Next, we turn to Augustine＊s way of dealing with disaster in De civitate dei. If there is any foundational dimension to be found in De civitate, it is in the Augustinian concept of permixtio, the entanglement of the two cities. This very permixtio functions as a razor cutting off each and every attempt to hypostatize negativity or to establish sovereignty reaching beyond the dynamics of the cursus of the entangled cities. As a result, the meaning of disaster (the utilitas calamitatis) should be assessed within the parameters of that entanglement. Thus the destruction of Carthage as alerting the reader semantically to historical catastrophe, becomes entangled in a more serious calamity resulting, not from historical disaster but from the failure to cope with victory which in the end comes down to the failure to cope with oneself.

This article helps fill a gap in studies on Augustine＊s thought, by focusing on forgiveness〞an ethical theme important to the Bishop of Hippo〞with particular attention to the role forgiveness plays, or can and should play, in political life. The City of God (De ciuitate dei; ciu.) opens wide vistas for such study. Augustine＊s reflections throughout his long work cast light on the many facets of forgiveness and related themes as they enter and impact social and civic life, characterized by our human condition in all its contingency, fallibility, and fallenness, while rooted deeply in divine creation and the goodness of nature, healed and elevated by grace even in this saeculum. The article＊s first segment argues that the theme of forgiveness or pardon, pagan and Christian, frames the entire ciu. The second segment studies three exemplars of forgiveness in political life highlighted by Augustine: Julius Caesar, David, and Theodosius. The third section comprises a brief conclusion, observing a parallel Augustine discerns between Virgil＊s and Jesus＊s teaching. This surprising confluence offers a vision of friendship forged by generous ※giving and forgiving§ across religious and cultural divides, and thus perhaps a partial foundation for unitas in our ※foundationless age.§

In ※Salvator Mundi: Via Crucis,§ Denise Levertov encounters Christ as he bears ※Incarnation＊s heaviest weight.§ In these fleeting moments, she writes, Christ finds himself ※out of his depth,§ enduring the ※sickened desire . . . to simply cease, to not be.§ The poet＊s meditation on these moments offers a useful lens for reconsidering Augustinian hope. In view of Christ＊s suffering as the incarnated divine promise, how does Augustine interpret the meaning of St. Paul＊s ※one hope§ (Eph. 4:4) and St. Peter＊s ※living hope§ (1 Pet. 1:3)? While other hopes unfold under the shadow of death, the life that is ※hidden with Christ in God§ (Col. 3:3) draws its hope out of the depths to which Christ has descended. This results in a new way of keeping time in God＊s promise: a way that for Augustine disrupts and exceeds, without abandoning, life in the saeculum.

Augustine believed that humans are and are called to be both slaves and friends of God. John 15:15, Jesus tells his disciples that they are no longer his slaves, but are instead his friends, thus posed a significant interpretive problem for him. This paper surveys Augustine＊s thirteen discussions of the passage, presenting several themes Augustine developed and interpretive strategies he tried out over two decades of interpreting the passage. His favorite strategy was reading the passage proleptically. The disciples were not yet friends of God at the time of Jesus＊s speaking but could look forward to a certain future when they will be friends of God. But this strategy couldn＊t solve the problem: Jesus treats slavery to and friendship with God as substitutes, not compossible. One theme was to associate slavery with fear. Augustine invoked this in his most extensive treatment of John 15:15, arguing that there are two species of slavery to God, each corresponding to a kind of fear. One fear, and thus one slavery, is compatible with friendship. The other is not. The paper concludes by identifying some further problems Augustine＊s approach raised.

There is a growing consensus in Augustinian studies that Augustine＊s two cities cannot be mapped neatly onto the distinction between Church and State. How, then, can he help illumine Church-State questions? In this essay, I examine how Henri de Lubac and Joseph Ratzinger (Benedict XVI) retrieve and build upon Augustine＊s theological-political thought to develop a contemporary Augustinan approach to Church-State relations. I begin by discussing how their attention to the movement of Augustine＊s thought leads them to recognize the importance of mysterium in his vision and develop a Eucharistic ecclesiology focused on the Church as corpus mysticum. I then show how this ecclesiology helps them to critique ways of thinking about Church-State relations that operate solely within a political-juridical paradigm. Both thinkers, I argue, root their vision of spiritual authority in this Augustinian ecclesiology, and maintain that it must be understood in different terms than political authority. I conclude that this vision of spiritual authority illumines the Church＊s perennial mission of elevating political life and its present mission of forming citizens capable of acting as leaven in their political communities.

One of Augustine＊s most controversial ideas is his ※order of love,§ which he explicates using a distinction between ※use§ (usus) and ※enjoyment§ (fruitio). Critics complain that, by encouraging us to ※use§ each other and the world to ※enjoy§ God, Augustine instrumentalizes human beings and temporal goods in ways that deny their intrinsic value. In recent years, influential scholars have challenged this critique by offering alternative accounts of Augustine＊s order of love and his distinction between use and enjoyment. Often overlooked is an essential aspect of this distinction, namely, its Roman legal context, where rights of ※usufruct§ and ※use§ not only authorize others to ※use§ property owned by others but also prescribe duties of stewardship and sustainability that govern such use. In what follows, I explain the Roman laws of usufruct and use and show how Augustine, as a bishop managing church property and adjudicating cases on the episcopal court, would have likely been familiar with such laws. I then show how recovering these Roman legal concepts supports alternative accounts of Augustine＊s order of love. In particular, when properly situated in their Roman legal and linguistic contexts, these concepts furnish a new interpretation of Augustine＊s ethics of ※use§ and cast new light on what it means to ※use§ and ※enjoy§ the commonwealth and creation. In addition to offering a new interpretative lens, I show how elevating the concept of usufruct can supply constructive resources for contemporary accounts of political and ecological ethics.

Among both the defenders and adversaries of orthodox Trinitarian dogma, the so-called ※kenosis hymn§ of Philippians 2 was of the utmost importance, whether in refuting opponents＊ teachings or articulating one＊s own. While historical theologians have extensively investigated its place in the works of Sts. Hilary and Augustine〞each the leading Latin pro-Nicene authority of his time〞a comparative examination of the two has not yet been undertaken. This article seeks to trace and account for Augustine＊s noteworthy improvement upon his predecessor＊s thought in the closely related realms of exegesis and Christology. It first summarizes the most relevant points of continuity and discontinuity in the Latin bishops＊ uses of the Pauline language of forma dei每forma serui. From there, it turns to the role of Phil. 2 in countering subordinationist readings of hotly contested scriptural texts, arguing that Augustine more ably responds to the challenges at hand. Finally, it argues that his employment of the forma dei每forma serui paradigm is closely linked to his teaching on the revelatory capacity of Christ＊s human nature. With regard to both, Augustine＊s teaching marks a bona fide development of Hilary＊s and thus of the Latin tradition more broadly.

Since the early Christian era, Psalm 142:2b, which declares the impossibility of anyone being justified before God, has elicited diverse interpretations from theologians. In this article, we examine the exegesis of Ps. 142:2 by two prominent theologians of the late fourth and early fifth centuries, Jerome and Augustine. We show that their interpretations of this verse were heavily influenced by their respective theological backgrounds and the controversies they were facing at the time. Jerome＊s anti-Origenist exegesis explains his rejection of the Pelagian perspective on Ps. 142:2, and Augustine＊s interpretation was mainly shaped by his (early) anti-Pelagian insistence on rejecting the possibility of living without sin. This article illustrates the complex interplay between theological controversies and scriptural interpretation in the early Christian Church.

This article explores Karl Rahner＊s assessment of Augustine＊s treatment of Old Testament theophanies and the Incarnation. It scrutinizes Rahner＊s contention that Augustine deviated from the Christological interpretation held by earlier church fathers and finds that while Augustine＊s interpretation differs from the majority of his predecessors, he is not the first significant church father to embrace such a view. Moreover, Augustine＊s approach to the theophanies is shown to have deep roots in both tradition and scripture, challenging the explanatory power of the Christological interpretation. The article then argues that it is unreasonable to link Augustine＊s theophanic non-peculiarity directly to a rejection of incarnational peculiarity. In addition to the absence of definitive texts denying Christ＊s incarnational peculiarity, along with texts clearly affirming it, Augustine＊s close association between the missions and processions〞an association that ultimately supports Rahner＊s Rule〞eliminates the possibility of him rejecting the Son＊s incarnational peculiarity. Consequently, Rahner＊s assertion about Augustine＊s alleged denial of incarnational peculiarity lacks solid grounding in Augustine＊s body of work.

This article traces Augustine＊s presentation of an exegetical rule for oneness based on scriptural patterns in three different anti-Homoian contexts throughout his life. First, his letter to Pascentius outlines how descriptions of oneness in Scripture that include an added phrase detailing ※one what§ indicate substantial difference. Pericopes without the additional ※one what,§ though, reveal that the beings are of the same substance. Then, Augustine＊s De trinitate builds upon this initial distinction by outlining how Trinitarian unity becomes the soteriological aim for the believers＊ oneness with one another. Just as the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are of one substance and of one mind and volition, so too humanity, who is already of one substance, must become of one mind and volition through the same faith. Finally, Augustine＊s encounter with Maximinus toward the end of his life elaborates further by explicating the significance of a verb＊s singularity or plurality in a biblical verse for substantial oneness. He incorporates an argument that has already appeared in his thought into his approach to oneness in Scripture. This article, therefore, contributes to a greater understanding of Augustine＊s exegetical arguments against Homoian theology and the trajectory of his pro-Nicene explanations over his life.

Augustine scholarship on grief has mostly focused on Confessiones 4 and 9 and De ciuitate dei 14.9, with a focus on how Augustine legitimates Christian expressions of grief. In this essay, I explore the ways in which his account of grief is inflected Christologically, with a primary focus on In Iohannis euangelium tractatus 49, 52, and 60, where Augustine reflects on a set of Johannine texts that speak of Jesus being ※troubled§: John 11:33, 12:27, and 13:21. The homiletic context adds to the traditional picture of grief in Augustine scholarship by drawing more attention to issues of Christology. In particular, the Johannine passages afford Augustine the opportunity to highlight the ways in which conceptions of divine power (potestas) shape an interpretation of the difference between Christ＊s unique experience of grief in comparison with ours. Christ＊s grief, Augustine emphasizes, is only ever voluntary, whereas we experience it involuntarily, and yet it is precisely this difference that prompts Augustine to focus his hearer＊s attention on how Christ＊s grief serves as the healing of our griefs.

This lecture seeks to resurrect the difficult project of a theology of history as a necessary correlate of renewed interest in political theology. The theme of history and politics is both ambitious and familiar, admitting a vast literature just within Augustine studies given his efforts to understand time, creation, and the historical careers of the ciuitas permixta and the ※most glorious§ ciuitas dei. That literature is usually focused on the much-debated saeculum and Augustine＊s rejection of cyclical history through a linear, universal history that admits apocalyptic discourse. My overarching goal is to inspire a contemporary Augustinian political theology that is more theological, more biblical, and more political, retrieving a contested category in the field: myth.

St. Augustine＊s commitment to the doctrine of predestination did not change from the early days of his ministry in the mid-390s to his last writings and sermons, shortly before his death in 430 CE. Two genres of Augustine＊s late communications address his teachings on predestination: First, his treatises, including De praedestinatione sanctorum and De dono perseuerantiae (CE 427每428); second〞and of greater interest for this article〞his often-overlooked mature and late sermons. Although treatises and sermons were contemporaneous, Augustine＊s purposes differ in each. Against arguments that ※the beginning of faith is of ourselves,§ in treatises, Augustine relied heavily on scriptural proof-texts to support his contention that God both foreknew and foreordained individuals＊ eternal destiny. The first intent of his sermons, however, was not to present scriptural authority for the doctrine, but to encourage his listeners＊ belief by helping them discern God＊s activity within themselves. Certainly, his congregation was attracted by the hope of eternal life and by the fear of eternal punishment, yet their present affections and actions also mattered in substantial ways that Augustine＊s doctrinal writings do not fully describe. We must look to his sermons, that is, to his (in-person) conversations with fellow members of Christ＊s body, if we are to recognize his attentiveness to the urgency of the present.

Tyconius＊ Liber regularum is a late fourth century treatise, often dubbed as ※the first (extant) Latin treatise on hermeneutics.§ This article investigates the following issue: What does Liber regularum as an introductio to hermeneutics amount to in the context of the other introductiones mentioned in Cassiodorus, Inst. 1.10? What has been presupposed by the author, what exactly is contended, and why has his treatise been called ※the first Latin treatise on hermeneutics§ when it is not limited to interpretative matters and discusses only a few selected hermeneutical issues? Indeed, the topic Tyconius almost exclusively focuses on is the unannounced change of reference within a sentence. He advises to recognize the seven compositional regulae mysticae in-built in scripture and, with the help of these, to determine the ever-changing references. In fact, this is what justifies calling his treatise a hermeneutical introductio. The compositional rules become hermeneutical rules and are immensely helpful for eliminating seeming contradictions in scripture. Particular attention is given to Augustine＊s critical reception of Tyconius＊ rules which mattered so much, in turn, for the reception of Tyconius.

Augustine combined two distinctions to develop an elegant interpretive framework for embracing multiple senses of ※resurrection,§ resolving tensions that had bedeviled predecessors such as Irenaeus and Tertullian. The first distinction was between the general resurrection of the body and an accompanying bodily transformation restricted to the saved. The second distinction, which he shared with many fourth-century authors but may have drawn most directly from Tyconius, was between a ※first,§ spiritual resurrection experienced now by the baptized and a ※second,§ bodily resurrection experienced eschatologically by all. Scholars have noted both distinctions separately but not explored how Augustine came to adopt them and use them in combination. Augustine deployed these distinctions together to resolve theological problems caused by apparent Pauline connections between the ※first§ resurrection of believers and the ※second§ resurrection of all.

The present article examines Contra Academicos 2.5 in which Augustine seems to detail the influence of the libri Platonicorum on his conversion. In the first part of the paper, I argue that Michael P. Foley is correct to interpret Augustine＊s phrase ※libri quidam pleni§ as a reference to the libri Platonicorum. I advance the further claim that Augustine primarily has in mind Ennead I.6. This is in contrast to the argument alluded to by Pierre Courcelle and formally given by John J. O＊Meara where such a reading of Contra Academicos misconstrues the relationship between Augustine and Plotinus. In response to O＊Meara, I advance a threefold argument, a corollary of which is a novel reading of a Latin phrase (bonas res Arabicas) that has perplexed scholars. In the second part of the paper, I use my reading of Contra Academicos along with two considerations from Ennead I.6 to motivate a deeper understanding of Augustine＊s conversion. The present study develops recent lines of thought in Augustine scholarship and seeks to open new avenues for understanding the libri Platonicorum and their influence on Augustine＊s conversion.

Several times, when faced with a difficult passage of scripture in Sermones ad populum, Augustine implores his audience, ※knock and it shall be opened§ (Matt. 7:7c; par. Luke 11:9c). Augustine uses this phrase to stress humility and the human need for God＊s activity when interpreting scripture. Studying the archeological record of domestic architecture of locked doors in Roman North Africa elucidates Augustine＊s message. Knowledge of the material culture shows that Augustine calls upon Christians to ※knock§ upon scripture as if it were a door, locked and barred in such a way that it could only be opened from inside. Thus, a reader of scripture is like a petitioner calling from outside a locked door, needing God to open its meaning. Augustine＊s use of ※knocking§ contrasts with the metaphor of ※keys§ to scripture, which was favored by Tyconius and other early Christian writers. In De doctrina Christiana, Augustine expresses concern that ※keys§ could lead a person into overconfidence, expecting to unlock obscure passages of the Bible by his or her own power. Augustine＊s frequent use of Matt. 7:7c is a call for exegetes to approach scripture with humility. All members of the totus Christus, great and small, must humbly knock. The image of ※knocking§ provides a versatile theological message: human effort is important, but the meaning of the Bible is ultimately unlocked by God＊s activity.

This article focuses on the unresolved scholarly question of how Confessiones, book 10 should be interpreted, proposing a new explanation as to how and why the second half of book 10 is critically important to this text. Emphasizing important relations between the introductory chapters and the second half of book 10, the article revisits Augustine＊s treatment of ambitio saeculi, interpreted as a state of will, with which author Augustine continues to struggle, even during his act of confessing publicly (i.e., in composing the book 10 text for publication). As a corruption of the motive behind his act of public confession, ambitio saeculi threatens to undermine the moral integrity of this same act. After Augustine recognizes that he cannot solve this moral flaw, he despairs and considers abandoning his human audience, and so, the very publication of his text. However, he is made newly capable of remaining, as confessant, before his readership, through a new, deeper conversion. This conversion to a new humility is given in and through the confessant＊s participation in the eucharistic sacrament, which provides a hopeful resolution to his ambitio saeculi.

Scholars do not agree on where Augustine exactly stands regarding capital punishment and whether his position is still relevant for debates today. This paper establishes Augustine＊s starting point for his considerations on the death penalty, identifies the scriptural input into his views, both critical and supportive of capital punishment, and, finally, examines how he approaches concrete cases of people facing the death penalty. On this basis, it makes a somewhat new proposal for understanding how Augustine sees capital punishment as legitimate in principle but problematic in concrete cases, in particular, cases involving the church.

A recent study has argued from theological and classicizing parallels that the first, anti-pagan book of Augustine＊s De consensu euangelistarum belongs between 406 and 412 CE. This article defends the traditional dating ca. 400每405 CE, implied by Retractationes. Uncertainty over the dating of parallels in De trinitate 1每4 cautions against reliance on theological peculiarities (a variant of John 5:19 and the phrase unitas personae, both otherwise paralleled in the 410s CE or later), while a close review of the patterns of classical citation proves resemblance to De ciuitate dei to be superficial. Not only does Augustine demonstrably cite the same classical texts on widely separated occasions, De consensu euangelistarum 1 evinces little of Augustine＊s later knowledge of Porphyry and Varro. The crowning proof comes, however, in a brief rebuttal to pagan complaints over contemporary misfortunes. Although he focuses on Rome＊s religious history, Augustine omits any hint of Alaric＊s sack (410 CE), the religious-political instability of 408每409 CE, or Radagaisus＊ invasion of Italy (405每406 CE), all of key importance for later works. The book＊s method, scope, and tenor place it neatly within the span 400每405 CE, as our first testimony to the interreligious milieu for which De ciuitate dei would later be aimed.

Noting how an hypothesis can turn into a truth simply by being repeated, this article examines carefully the basis for the date normally given for this sermon and the frailty of the textual tradition that is the basis for the Morin edition of this sermon. After a careful analysis of the factors that might help to date it, it is assigned an uncertain date. It remains, however, plausible to think that it was delivered ad mensam Cypriani. The analysis of the transmission of this sermon includes several new manuscripts, a new stemma and several general observations about its transmission. This article concludes with comments about the content and a new edition of the Latin text of the sermon.

This article investigates the place of De magistro within Augustine＊s developing theology of words and the Word through a reverse chronological reading. This is necessary because, despite its emphasis on words, De magistro never refers to Christ as the ※Word.§ It would be easy, therefore, to see it as unrelated to the theological emphasis on that title in later works such as De trinitate. A reverse chronological reading, however, establishes Augustine＊s developing understanding of the relationship between words and the Word in a way that moves us from a full-throated theology of divine and human speech backward into more exploratory engagements with nascent ideas. When this reverse trail is traced, we can begin to see De magistro as one key starting point for it by providing warrant for seeing the inner Christ as necessarily the Word of God, even if not explicitly named as such. Such a reading adds deeper theological significance to a text often read only in terms of its contribution to semiotics and epistemology. In this reading, De magistro is an essential text for understanding Augustine＊s fuller theology of language not only because of its early sign theory but because it sets the soteriological stage for our growth into the likeness of Christ the Word.

This article aims to offer an overview of the problem of suicide in Augustine of Hippo, from the anti-Manichean texts of the late 380s CE to De ciuitate dei and the rejoinder to Gaudentium (Contra Gaudentium). A transversal analysis of the evolution of the concept of voluntary death throughout the work of Augustine allows us to identify up to four different conceptions of suicide, each of them corresponding to a rather well-defined chronological period: a philosophical conception, that we find in De libero arbitrio; a moral one, that we can excerpt from De mendacio; a polemical approach in the context of controversy against Donatism, which we can retrace in a set of writings from 400 to 412 CE, and especially in Contra epistulam Parmeniani; and, finally, the conception of suicide as homicide, that appears in De ciuitate dei and that will define the decisive and most widespread doctrine of Augustine in this matter. In this way, this paper aims to enrich, from a transversal and chronological perspective, the studies that have been carried out over the last decades on suicide in Augustine.

St. Augustine, pictured by Western painters holding in his hand his heart blazing with passionate love, consistently and repeatedly insisted求from his earliest writings until close to his death求that the essential characteristic of God is ※God is love§ (1 John 4:16). Yet he also insisted on the doctrines of original sin and everlasting punishment for the massa damnata. This article will not explore the rationale or semantics of his arguments, nor the detail and nuance of the doctrines of predestination and perseverance. Rather, I seek to understand, from Augustine＊s last writings, how he reconciled his strong conviction that God is love with doctrines requiring belief in a God who determined the fate of individuals to eternal reward or punishment ※before the foundation of the world§ (Eph. 1:4), a God indifferent to individuals＊ actions, struggles, or longings. My primary interest is not on Augustine＊s ability to render these two apparently opposing ideas of God intellectually compatible, but rather on his feeling, gathered from his last sermons, as he approached death. In brief, how could Augustine love the God in whom he believed?

The following article examines Augustine＊s efforts in De gestis Pelagii (gest. Pel.), the bishop of Hippo＊s commentary on the acts of the Synod of Diospolis at which Pelagius was acquitted of heresy in December 415 CE. Gest. Pel. is far from an attempt to offer an impartial account of the synod＊s events. Rather, it forms a key part of Augustine＊s efforts in the aftermath of Diospolis to re-interpret what appeared to be a disaster for the anti-Pelagian cause. In this sense, gest. Pel. is a work with a clear rhetorical purpose. The question at the heart of this article is whether, as two scholars have recently suggested, Augustine＊s rhetorical aims in this work led him to consciously misrepresent the facts〞about the synod＊s decision, Pelagius＊s views, and his own history with Pelagius. I will argue that we can plausibly take Augustine at his word in gest. Pel.

An ancient Hebrew poem of uncertain background and fastidiously subtle formal technique is made the subject of a commentary by a fifth-century Latin bishop with no Hebrew, working with a poor Latin translation, who, moreover, dismisses the formal complexities of the composition as irrelevant to interpretation. Claiming to detect hidden depths beneath the Great Psalm＊s limpid surface, Augustine uses it as an opportunity to revisit some of the favorite themes of his own later writing. Has he read the text with sufficient sympathy to discover anything in it that might correspond to the poet＊s intentions? Comparing his approach with Ambrose＊s earlier and very different one, we notice some unexpected interpretative strengths in the earlier work. But Augustine＊s attentiveness to connections between lines and stanzas and to the repetition of key vocabulary reveals a close attunement to the emotional movements of the poem. His contention that the Psalmist＊s ※law§ is to be understood as Saint Paul＊s ※law of faith§ is not imposed on the text, but allowed to emerge from its sequential development, and especially from its opening and closing lines.

The majority of contemporary presentations of Augustine＊s spirituality focus on the interior, personal dimensions of prayer and contemplation. This article argues that Augustine also has a rich but underappreciated liturgical spirituality, wherein regular participation in the liturgy, with its external and ecclesial elements, is important for Christian spiritual formation and expression. Examining a variety of texts from the Augustinian corpus, this article outlines major themes in Augustine＊s liturgical spirituality and encourages further scholarly engagement with this theme.

This is the first of two responses to Peter Iver Kaufman＊s article, ※Hopefully, Augustine.§ Michael Lamb, author of A Commonwealth of Hope: Augustine＊s Political Thought, analyzes the conceptual and interpretive assumptions related to hope and politics implicit in Kaufman＊s account. Lamb defends an account of hope as a virtue that allows properly ordered hope for political goods and considers the implications of a more expansive view of politics for understanding Augustine＊s thought.

Augustine uses an unusual scriptural variant for the ending of John 5:19 twelve times. Ten occur in several Trinitarian writings produced around 418每420 CE. There is sufficient evidence to argue that Augustine＊s use of Jerome＊s translation of Didymus the Blind＊s De spiritu sancto accounts for the presence of the variant in these writings. Augustine＊s two earlier uses are more difficult to explain. The variant appears once in a sermon delivered at the end of 411 CE and once in De consensu euangelistarum, Book One, which is generally dated to 403每404 CE. The following article argues that Augustine＊s use of ps.-Athanasius＊s De trinitate, Book XI likely accounts for these two early uses.

This article demonstrates the intersection of Augustine＊s pedagogy and theology through a case study of his threats of divine judgment (eschatological cataplexis) in catechesis. Augustine＊s use of this rhetorical device resists recent scholarship that has sought to ameliorate Augustine＊s vision of hell. Augustine＊s cataplexis in the catechumenate elucidates the practical side of his mature theological reflections on hellfire and eternal damnation: why catechists should utilize fear as an act of love, how fear cannot cause salvation in and of itself, and how in the faithful, general fear is refined to shed servile fear, that avoids the bad, in favor of chaste fear, that seeks the good. Augustine＊s view of love and teaching prove to be intimately intertwined with his vision of fear and an eternal hell.

When Augustine wrote about having discovered a hope (diuersa spes) different from the political ambitions that drew him to Rome then Milan (spes saeculi), he referred to Christians＊ hopes for celestial reward. But several colleagues suggest that he also harbored hopes for a kinder political culture. Discussions of Augustine＊s hopes have enlivened the study of political theory and political theology for several generations. During the twenty-first century two influential volumes took him as their inspiration for ※hopeful citizenship§ and ※democratic citizenship.§ Recently, two perceptive studies propose variations on the themes introduced there. What follows deploys several of Hannah Arendt＊s observations about Augustine to suggest that his political hopes were somewhat more restricted but more radical than the latest contributions to his political theology suggest.

This is the second of two responses to Peter Kaufman＊s article ※Hopefully, Augustine.§ Veronica Roberts Ogle, author of Politics and the Earthly City in Augustine＊s City of God, probes the degree to which her articulation of Augustinian political activity〞and any hopes that might accompany it〞overlaps or contrasts with Kaufman＊s more minimalist conception.

In what sense did Augustine attribute desires to the human body itself? Scholars disagree substantially about how to answer this question, yet it has rarely been treated as anything approaching a scholarly quaestio disputata. Some hold that bodily desire is in principle impossible according to Augustine＊s anthropology. Others hold that bodily desire is of marginal significance in Augustine＊s system. Still others hold that bodily desire is a central problem in human life according to Augustine. This essay is an intervention intended to prompt further exchange about the interpretation of Augustine＊s thought on the issue of bodily desire. To achieve that goal, the essay closely examines two texts from Augustine＊s writings against Julian of Eclanum in the early 420s. In book I of De nuptiis et concupiscentia, Augustine argues that the body does have its own desires and they are an extensive problem in human life. Furthermore, in Contra Iulianum we find that Augustine himself responds to three crucial objections that might be raised against my interpretation. In short, late in his life Augustine treated bodily desire as a grave and pervasive problem. The essay does not address his views in his earlier works. As an intervention, the essay inevitably prompts important questions it cannot fully address, especially around Augustine＊s philosophy of mind, the development of Augustine＊s thought, and the implications of Augustine＊s claims about the body for other elements of his theological project. Future investigations will hopefully take up these topics in the scholarly exchange this intervention intends to foster.

In his last years, St. Augustine became impatient with the doctrinal questions and requests for advice on practical matters of ecclesiastical discipline frequently referred to in correspondence of his last decade. Scholars have often attributed his uncharacteristic reluctance to address these matters to the diminishing competence and energy of old age. This article demonstrates that his evident unwillingness to respond at length to such queries relates rather to his desire to sequester increased time for meditation. Throughout his Christian life, he described and refined his practice of meditation; it gathered urgent importance as he neared death. Augustine＊s lifelong search for ※God and the soul,§ articulated in his first writings, evolved through his meditation, changing from an intellectual effort to achieve a vision of God by the use of reason to a search for the truth of his own life. In meditation he sought to recall in detail God＊s loving leading within the chaos and pain of his youthful desires and throughout his life. I explore his understanding of ※God is love§ from his earliest (extant) treatise, De beata uita (386 CE), his Easter sermons on First John (415 CE), to his Enchiridion (421 CE) as the core of his developing understanding of God＊s activity in himself.

This essay theorizes the interplay between Augustine＊s vision of prayer and his theological treatment of labor. In so doing, it articulates some of the broader economic implications of Augustine＊s theological system. More particularly, this essay theorizes the conceptual slippage between a prayerful life of Christian existence aimed at the beatific vision and labor properly related to, directed, undertaken, and contextualized. I argue that under the right conditions〞conditions similar to those Augustine recognizes in a monastic context, and dissimilar to those fostered in contemporary capitalism〞labor can become a modality of prayer. When labor is undertaken in this manner〞which is made possible by God＊s efficacious grace and the transformative power of the virtues〞it is possible for the boundaries between labor and prayer to blur, such that the whole of one＊s labor is grafted into one＊s larger life of prayer before God. That mode of labor and prayer depends on forms of time, relationality, and selfhood that contrast sharply with typical features of labor undertaken in contemporary capitalism, all of which will be briefly canvased in conclusion.

In this article, I explore how Augustine uses sermonic rhetoric to bring about the transfiguration of Babylon, the city of humankind, into Jerusalem, the city of God. Focusing on Enarratio in Psalmum 147, I show how Augustine situates his audience between two spectacles, the Roman theater and games and the eschatological vision of God. Augustine seeks to turn his hearers＊ eyes and hearts from the one spectacle to the other, from the love of this world to love of the next. In the process, Augustine wages battle on two fronts: he criticizes pagan Roman culture, on the one hand, and Donatist Christian separatism and perfectionism, on the other. Through his preaching, Augustine stages yet another spectacle, the history of God＊s mercy and love, whereby God affirmed the world＊s goodness by using it as the means of healing and transfiguration. Indeed, Augustine does not simply depict the spectacle of salvation; he seeks to make his hearers into that spectacle by exhorting them to practice mercy, thereby inscribing them into the history of God＊s love and helping gradually transfigure them into the heavenly Jerusalem.

This article argues that De trinitate advocates a process of ※reading§ God through metaphor. For Augustine, as for Plotinus, human beings understand God (to the degree that this is possible) not by analyzing him rationally but by seeing him through the metaphor of the human mind. But unlike Plotinus, Augustine claims that the imago dei, with its triadic structure of memory, understanding, and will, serves as metaphor only to the extent that it experiences Christ＊s redemptive illumination. The act of metaphor is a kind of interior ※reading§ during which the mind reads the imago dei as a mental text, interprets this text through Christ＊s aid, and is simultaneously transformed into a better image.

In this article, I build upon Jean-Albert Vinel＊s account of Augustine＊s ※liturgical argument§ against the Pelagians by exploring how and why Augustine uses both the givenness of the practice of infant baptism and its ritual components as evidence for his theological conclusions in opposition to those of the Pelagians. First, I explore infant baptism in the Roman North African Church before and during Augustine＊s ministry. Second, I interpret Augustine＊s rhetorical adaptation of the custom in his attempt to delineate the defining characteristics of Catholic Christianity in the early fifth century. I show how Augustine mobilizes his belief in the efficacy of the Church＊s practice of infant baptism to make explicit a boundary marker of ※Catholic§ Christianity, which was long implicit in the practice itself. Perceiving the consequences of Pelagianism, Augustine organizes his anti-Pelagian soteriology around the central node of infant baptism, the most theologically and rhetorically strategic means by which he could refute the Pelagian heresy and underwrite what he understood to be the traditional vision of sin and salvation evident in the baptismal rite.

Recent scholarship has held that De ciuitate Dei was aimed primarily at Christians. Through a comprehensive study of Augustine＊s correspondence with known readers of De ciuitate Dei, this article argues that he in fact intended it for practical outreach. Beginning with the exchange with Volusianus and Marcellinus, it argues that the ※circle of Volusianus§ was not comprised of self-confident pagans but of a dynamic group of locals and 谷migr谷s, pagan and Christian, who had briefly coalesced around Volusianus and Marcellinus. The Carthaginian social situation did not greatly change, therefore, after Marcellinus＊s execution and Volusianus＊s departure. Neither did Augustine＊s aims, of which the same picture emerges from Augustine＊s later correspondence with Macedonius, Evodius, Peter and Abraham, Firmus, and Darius, and from Orosius. Augustine intended, from the first inception of De ciuitate Dei to the eve of his death, to use it to equip Christians with arguments and, through those Christians＊ efforts in turn, to convince once-reluctant pagans to embrace the truth of its claims.

This paper explores changing attitudes toward novelty in early Christianity by focusing on a case study: Augustine of Hippo. It demonstrates that Augustine develops an unapologetically Christian version of the argument from antiquity, unapologetically Christian in that he redefines the very meaning of antiquity in terms of proximity to Christ and in that he relocates the argument from antiquity from the realm of apologetics, where it had become a stock weapon in the arsenal of his predecessors, to the realm of intramural Christian debate. In the process, Augustine relativized temporal measures of ※novelty§ and ※antiquity§ and recalibrated the meaning of these terms theologically, with reference to Christ.

In St. Augustine＊s society, men＊s tears were not considered a sign of weakness, but an expression of strong feeling. Tears might be occasional, prompted by incidents such as those Augustine described in the first books of his Confessiones. Or they might accompany a deep crisis, such as his experience of conversion. Possidius, Augustine＊s contemporary biographer, reported that on his deathbed Augustine wept copiously and continuously. This essay endeavors to understand those tears, finding, primarily but not exclusively in Augustine＊s later writings, descriptions of his practice of meditation suggesting that a profound and complex range of emotions from fear and repentance to gratitude, love, rest in beauty, and delight in praise richly informed Augustine＊s last tears.

This article argues that Augustine＊s understanding of the internal dynamics of number, order, and weight as they pertain to corporeal creatures supplies the basis for an analogy which characterizes the process of the soul＊s reformation. In other words, Augustine understands the soul＊s simplicity in an analogous manner to the simplicity of corporeal creatures, and the simplicity of corporeal creatures is determined by the relations between number, order, and weight. This analogy shows that Augustine conceives of the soul as a composite entity with different loves as its constituent parts. In the process of reformation, the soul acquires an ordered disposition as those loves become more like one another. By virtue of this ordered disposition, the soul also acquires a greater degree of integration or number because the likeness of weight among its constituent parts allows the soul to move as a unity toward God as its final end.

This article examines Augustine＊s early anthropology, particularly through De Genesi aduersus Manichaeos. The most thorough treatment of this topic is found in the enduring work of Robert J. O＊Connell, SJ. O＊Connell argues that Augustine drew directly from the Enneads in De Genesi aduersus Manichaeos to formulate his anthropology. This article evaluates and critiques the evidence and implications of O＊Connell＊s position concerning Augustine＊s articulation of the ※fall of the soul.§ I argue that an attentive text-based reading of De Genesi aduersus Manichaeos reveals the shortcomings of O＊Connell＊s ※Plotinian§ rendering of Augustine＊s anthropology. More importantly, I show that De Genesi aduersus Manichaeos illuminates dimensions of Augustine＊s anthropology often overlooked. These include the human＊s transformation to spiritalis through Christ and the eschatological configuration of the caeleste corpus. In contrast to O＊Connell＊s theory, which emphasizes the necessary ※circularity§ of Augustine＊s anthropological framework (that is, the soul ※returns§ to a condition identical to the aboriginal state), I argue that in De Genesi aduersus Manichaeos Augustine advances an anthropology that is not merely ※circular.§

This article explores a possible tension in Augustine＊s thought between his response to the misconduct of clergy, which stressed swift discipline, and his anti-Donatist theology of sacraments, which emphasized the efficacy of sacraments apart from the moral worthiness of the clergy. I identify five principles that Augustine followed in his handling of clerical misconduct: 1) Decisive action that usually resulted in removal of the offenders from ministry; 2) concern for the rights of the victim over clerical privilege; 3) a just hearing for the accused clergyman; 4) concern for transparency in all proceedings; 5) personal accountability of the bishop for the behavior of his clergy. I conclude by noting several aspects of Augustine＊s anti-Donatist ecclesiology and sacramental theology that help to resolve the apparent tension.

Epistula 151 shows Augustine trying to exert pressure on a high-ranking imperial official from his position outside of the senatorial elite. The aristocrat Caecilianus had written a letter, now lost, chastising Augustine for his lack of correspondence. Augustine＊s reply begins and ends according to typical epistolary conventions. The heart of the letter, however, narrates Augustine＊s harrowing experience of the arrest and execution of the brothers Marcellinus and Apringius by the imperial commander Marinus. The profound spiritual contrast between villain and victims has the potential to damage Caecilianus＊s reputation, forcing him into a corner. He can only agree with Augustine and act accordingly.

In a curious turn of phrase that he offered to a particular congregation, Augustine claims that a belch became the Gospel: ※Ipsa ructatio euangelium est.§ The reference comes at the end of a longer digression in Sermon (s.) 341 [Dolbeau 22] about how John the Evangelist, a fisherman, came to produce his Gospel, namely he belched out what he drank in. The use of a mundane word like ructare in an oration concerning a divine being contravenes a rhetorical prohibition known as tapinosis. This kind of speech was prohibited in ancient oratory because it humiliated the subject of the declamation, and this was especially problematic if the subject was divine. According to Augustine＊s reading of scripture, if the divine willfully chose to be humiliated in order to teach humility to others by example, then the person delivering a speech about the divine could contravene this oratorical vice. This article argues that Augustine does precisely that in s. 341 by examining the reasons for Augustine＊s use of the terms ructare and iumentum. Specifically, it traces their usage in various Latin texts from Cicero to Plautus to the Psalms. It argues that the virtue of humility is manifest in the very language which Augustine deploys all along the way.

This article argues that, in De Trinitate, Augustine＊s ascent to God via a search for the Trinity is successful precisely because of the emphasis he places on the role of Christ in such an ascent. Unlike scholarship which reads this ascent as an exercise in Neoplatonism〞whether as a success or as an intentional failure〞this article asserts that Augustine successfully discovers an imago trinitatis in human beings by identifying the essential mediation of the temporal and eternal in the person of the Incarnate Word. Of the work＊s fifteen books, Books 4 and 13 focus extensively on the soteriological and epistemological role of Christ, who, in his humility, conquered the pride of the devil and reopened humanity＊s way to eternity. The Christology in these books plays an important role in Augustine＊s argument by allowing his ascent to move from self-knowledge to contemplation of God. Indeed, it is his understanding of the Christological perfection of the imago dei which allows Augustine to discover a genuine imago trinitatis in human beings. For Augustine, the imago is observable in humanity to the extent that an individual is conformed to Christ, the perfect image of the invisible God. Thus, it is only through Christ that a human being can successfully contemplate the Trinity in this imago.

Augustine＊s doctrine of Jewish witness maintains that, although Christianity has superseded Judaism as the one true religion, it is God＊s will that the Jews continue to exist because they preserve and authenticate the Old Testament, divinely-inspired texts which foretold the coming of Jesus. Thus, Christian rulers are obligated to protect the religious liberties of the Jewish people, and the church should focus its missionary efforts on pagans rather than Jews. Current scholarly consensus holds that Augustine adhered consistently to this doctrine from its first iteration in Contra Faustum in 398 until his death in 430. However, this essay argues that, when Augustine spoke his last words on the subject in the Tractatus Aduersus Iudaeos (427每430), the doctrine was no longer his primary guide in thinking about how Christians should interact with Jews. In marked contrast to his earlier views, here, Augustine passionately urges Jews to accept Christ and encourages his congregation to try to convert them. This reading of the Tractatus Aduersus Iudaeos calls for a re-examination of the development of Augustine＊s teaching, particularly in the context of dramatic changes in imperial policy toward Jews in the 420s.

While the connections between exegesis, music, and moral formation are well known, what Augustine＊s use of particular metaphors reveals about his theology that more literal renderings do not is less clear. This article explores how Augustine＊s use of musical metaphors in en Ps. 32(2) illuminate his understanding of the relationship between grace and human virtue. After first offering a doctrinal description of the rightly ordered will and its Christological foundation, Augustine proceeds to narrate the Christian life as one of various stages of learning to sing the ※new song§ of Christ. He interprets references to the lyre and psaltery as figures of earthly and heavenly life, and then exegetes the psalm＊s language of jubilation as laudatory praise of the ineffable God. The chief contribution of the musical metaphors here are twofold. First, they enable Augustine to display the mysterious process of the will transformed over time. Second, the musical figures help Augustine account for how a human will, encompassed in time, can align with the will of an eternal God whose will is ultimately inexpressible. Augustine＊s musical exegesis is able to gesture towards the profound mystery of human life in time and its relation to an eternally un-timed God.

While many scholars have explored the Ciceronian roots of Augustine＊s thought, the influence of De Finibus on De ciuitate dei has, as yet, remained unexamined. Dismissed by Testard as abstract and scholastic, De Finibus has long remained in the shadow of Cicero＊s other work of moral philosophy, Tusculanae Dispuationes. This article reconsiders the nature of De Finibus and demonstrates its importance for De ciuitate dei. It begins by arguing that the dialogue is actually a meta-commentary on philosophic dogmatism, showing how each of the schools that Cicero＊s interlocutors represent〞i.e., the Epicureans, Stoics, and Peripatetics〞claim certainty about the Wise Man＊s happiness. At the heart of the dialogue＊s drama is Cicero＊s skepticism about this claim. This article then shows how Augustine picks up on Cicero＊s explanation as to why the adherents of these schools cling so tightly to their belief in the Wise Man＊s happiness. Echoing Cicero, Augustine suggests that the reason for this belief is therapeutic. Going beyond Cicero, however, he diagnoses it as a symptom of pride, arguing that what the philosophers really need is not a model of self-sufficient virtue, but a Mediator. The article ends by briefly considering how Cicero might respond to Augustine＊s position.

Joy is an affective state that, unlike fear and grief, has a certain continuity with the anticipated affective dispositions of heavenly life: for those who long for the heavenly ※life of felicity,§ joy responds to the same object of love and contemplation, i.e., God, whether they are on earth or in heaven. But the mortal, finite believer encounters certain obstacles to full vision and to sustained contemplation in this earthly life. This fact reveals fundamental difficulties in tracing the continuity Augustine posits in De ciuitate dei 14.9 across earthly and heavenly emotions, especially given the differences he also posits between earthly (temporal) and heavenly (eternal) states. This article examines how Augustine describes the affective (and, in particular, experiential) qualities of believers＊ earthly and heavenly joy and jubilation with particular attention to the (dis)continuities between their temporal and eternal expressions in both speech and song. I argue that, by transcending the temporally-spoken word, the non-verbal cry or song comes closest to matching the expression of heavenly joy as it responds to the God who surpasses utterance, and whose embrace fulfills understanding and elicits inexhaustible love and praise.

Among the ※patristic§ authorities that Augustine invokes near the end of his anti-Pelagian work De natura et gratia is a couplet from Ambrose＊s hymn, ※Iam Surgit Hora Tertia.§ While these lines have been cited as evidence of the hymn＊s authenticity, few have examined their function and meaning in the context of the treatise. I argue that the lines illustrate Augustine＊s distinctive use of authorities in De natura et gratia and that this use is driven by two primary motives: first, Augustine wants to counter Pelagius＊s use and citation of authorities in Pelagius＊s work De natura; and, second, Augustine wants to advance his own views on the necessity of the grace of Christ. Turning to ※Iam Surgit,§ I first show that Augustine seeks to counter a potential Pelagian ※abuse§ of the hymn, and especially the way the Pelagians might exploit its reference to ※merit.§ I then speculate that Augustine uses the hymn to offer implicit support for his own understanding of grace since, according to his reading, the source of forgiveness in Ambrose＊s hymn is the gratia Christi. Augustine thus shows not only that Ambrose＊s words are media, that is, equally supportive of both sides in the dispute, but also that they advance Augustine＊s developing views on the priority of the grace of Christ in the prayers of humanity.

※Only a living person can be a dying one,§ writes Augustine in De ciuitate dei 13.9. For Augustine, this strange fact offers us an occasion for reflection. If we are indeed racing toward the end on a cursus ad mortem, when do we pass the finish line? A living person is ※in life§ (in uita), while a dead one is post mortem. But as ciu. 13.11 asks: is anyone ever in morte, ※in death?§ This question must be asked alongside an earlier one, which had motivated Augustine＊s struggle in Confessiones 11.14.17 to make sense of time from the very beginning: quid est enim tempus? What is at stake here is whether or not there is such a thing as an instant of death: a moment when someone is no longer alive but not yet dead, a moment when they are ※dying§ (moriens) in the present tense. If we want to understand Augustine＊s question about the time of death in ciu. 13, then we have to frame it in terms of the interrogation of time proper in conf. 11.

The city of Jerusalem is the focal point of Augustine＊s exegesis of the Psalms of Ascent. In Enarratio in Psalmum 121, Augustine presents Jerusalem as a collective unity contemplating God＊s being. The city is thoroughly established in peace and love and participates intimately in the divine life. The essential features of the Jerusalem described in Enarratio in Psalmum 121 align neatly with the created intellectual realm of contemplation (caelum caeli) outlined in Confessiones Book?12. Both texts envisage a city that participates in the divine idipsum. This city is a creature so intimate with God＊s being that its creaturely mutability is checked. Both texts articulate this created intellectual realm as participating in God＊s eternity. In both cases, this participation is realized in contemplation: through the constancy of its vision, it is conformed to that which it sees. Finally, both the aeterna Ierusalem and caelum caeli are a communion〞in fact, a city〞united in love. In Enarratio in Psalmum 121, Augustine urges his congregants to join themselves to this edifice that is still under construction; in the Confessiones, he presents himself as a pilgrim groaning and longing with desire to be part of the Jerusalem that is above, his mother and patria.

This article investigates the relationship between Neoplatonism and Christianity in Augustine＊s conception of spiritual exercises. It focuses on the proem to the Confessions, where, in nuce, Augustine mentions many of the great themes of his work. The relationship between Neoplatonism and Christianity in this section seems to be complex, dynamic, and far from ※either?/?or,§ a detail which confirms some trends in the recent literature. This article contributes to better understanding of Augustine＊s spiritual exercises as well as to the long-running dispute about the role played by Neoplatonism within Augustine＊s Christian philosophy.

Gregory the Great depicts himself as a contemplative who, as bishop of Rome, was compelled to become an administrator and pastor. His theological response to this existential tension illuminates the vexed questions of his relationships to predecessors and of his legacy. Gregory develops Augustine＊s thought in such a way as to satisfy John Cassian＊s position that contemplative vision is grounded in the soul＊s likeness to the unity of Father and Son. For Augustine, ※mercy§ lovingly lifts the neighbor toward life in God. Imitating God＊s own love for humankind, this mercy likens the Christian to God＊s essential goodness and, by this likeness, prepares him or her for the vision of God, which Augustine expects not now but only in the next life. For Augustine, the exercise of mercy can〞when useful〞involve a shared affection or understanding. Gregory makes this shared affection essential to the neighborly love that he calls ※compassion.§ In this affective fellowship, Gregory finds a human translation of the passionless unity of Father and Son〞so that, for Gregory, compassion becomes the immediate basis for and consequence of seeing God〞even in this life. Compassion does not degrade; rather, it retrenches the perfection of contemplation. Reconciling compassionate activity and contemplative vision, this creative renegotiation of Augustine and Cassian both answered Gregory＊s own aspirations and gave to the tumultuous post-Imperial West a needed account of worldly affairs as spiritual affairs.

Why was Eve created? In De Genesi ad litteram, Augustine notoriously gives the answer that it was only causa pariendi, ※for the sake of childbearing.§ Other late antique interpreters of Genesis emphasize the purpose of conjugal union and domesticity. But a fuller reading of Augustine＊s thoughts on the subject reveals the moment between the creation of Eve and the fall as pregnant with extraordinary possibility. This moment, of indeterminate length〞for humans had not yet fallen into time〞provides an opportunity for Augustine to unleash his theological imagination. This lecture is about paradise. It eschews the customary focus on Adam＊s paradisal desire to think about Eve＊s beginning. Augustine uses this beginning to emphasize the importance of sociality, and of marriage as its most perfect realization. He takes the quotidian miracle of childbirth as our closest intimation of God＊s act of creation. And he imagines new meanings for the trinity of Villanova＊s motto: ueritas, unitas, and caritas.

This essay analyzes the subtle theology of laughter that is scattered across Augustine＊s Confessiones (conf.). First, I draw on Sarah Byers＊s work in order to argue that Augustine adopts and adapts Stoic moral psychology as a means of sorting the laugh into two moral kinds〞as evidence of either good joy or bad joy. In turn, these two kinds provide the loose structure for the double theological taxonomy of merciless and merciful laughter that conf. develops. Next, I treat laughter of each sort via exegesis of several textual vignettes. Close readings of key passages show that both merciless and merciful laughter evince distinctive features across Augustine＊s conf. This also reveals exactly how Augustine embeds laughter＊s double taxonomy in order to confect his own salvation narrative. Thus, on the reading offered here, laughter proves central to the salvation history that Augustine＊s conf. weaves. We learn a good deal about Augustine＊s story and his theology by attending to the subject, object, and character of laughter that may be found in his conf.

How did John＊s Gospel draw and compel Augustine before and during the composition of Confessiones? Analyzing references to John in Augustine＊s works from his embrace of Nicene Christianity to the writing of Confessiones, this paper finds a growing (and Johannine-based) emphasis on the importance of Christ＊s humanity. Augustine strategically invokes two texts in Confessiones＊ crucial seventh book: John 1:14, ※the Word was made flesh,§ and John 14:6, ※I am the way, the truth, and the life.§ This paper considers three features: First, how the rhetorical device of anticipation (prolepsis) allows Augustine simultaneously to unify his developing Christological perspective and to build drama into his conversion narrative. Second, how the structure of Confessiones, which first works to understand divine transcendence and then seeks to relate that divine transcendence back to time, emphasizes the central role played by the Gospel of John in advancing Augustine＊s conversion story. Third and finally, how invocations of John＊s Gospel typify the way that, for the Augustine of Confessiones, reading scripture had become the means of achieving new spiritual self-comprehension. Texts from John were not mere receptors or reflectors of spiritual forces that moved Augustine toward conversion, but, rather, powerful agents of conversion in their own right.

In the spirit of Augustine＊s own ※Reconsiderations,§ and inspired by Peter Brown＊s act of ※reconsidering§ in the Epilogue to Augustine of Hippo (new edition), this essay offers a reconsideration of Augustine＊s work On Marriage and Concupiscence. Key to the reconsideration of this text is a reconsideration of the role of the ※sacrament§ of marriage in Augustine＊s articulation and defense of the goods of marriage and of human sexuality. For Augustine, Julian＊s advocacy of concupiscence as an innocent natural desire amounts to a dangerous sentimentalization of fallen human freedom. Such sentimentalization masks the investments of the fallen will in the will to power or, in Augustinian terms, the preference for power over justice. Because sexual concupiscence, as Augustine famously argued, has no natural object, but, rather, is invested only in its own gratification, it is therefore a function of the preference for power over justice without remainder. It is a mark of the Fall that the procreative increase in human community willed by God is now ineluctably linked to the will to power, as though the will to power were the true source of social solidarity. The sacramental good of marriage enables married couples to ※use§ concupiscence in such a way that all of the goods associated with human sexuality can be experienced as true goods instead of as realities constitutively defined by the will to power.

Scholars agree that Christology is at the center of the In Iohannis euangelium tractatus. In his exegesis of the Gospel of John, Augustine particularly highlights the human nature of the Incarnated, even as he integrates Trinitarian arguments (which he had developed earlier in his De trinitate) as a cornerstone of his homiletic teaching. This may have been important for the later reception of Augustine＊s Trinitarian thought. Christology is clearly present throughout the various parts of the work. The differences between the parts can be traced to the various contexts in which they were composed and/or delivered: e.g., the Anti-Donatist controversy that is behind the first sermons, and the Anti-Pelagian and Anti-Homean controversies that often fueled the later ones. Sometimes anti-heretical strategies are used as a crucial step for advancing the teaching of the preacher (not least because they can directly promote knowledge of the fundamentals of the faith), even if the heresy being opposed is of no immediate relevance or importance to the North Africa of Augustine＊s day (e.g., that of the ※Sabellians§ or the ※Apollinarians§). Surprisingly, the second half of the work (consisting as it does of shorter homilies or, better, drafts of homilies) contains various passages in which anti-heretical strategies were clearly pursued. It is particularly Augustine＊s Anti-Pelagian strategy that provides us with clues regarding the historical context of this part of the work.

Although the doctrine of the affections constitutes an essential part of both psychology and ethics for Classical Greek philosophy, the passion of sorrow was seldom discussed. The Bible, by contrast, frequently mentions the feeling of sorrow, and Christianity, unlike Stoic ethical ideals, assigns sorrow a positive significance〞at least to a degree. While it is true that the Gospels generally prefer to paint a picture of Christ as a quiet teacher and master, a few pericopes〞especially within the Gospel of John〞narrate the sorrow of Jesus in some detail. Integrating the Johannine depictions of Jesus＊s sorrow proved quite a challenge for patristic and medieval exegetes, including Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Both thinkers wrote a Commentary on the Gospel of John and, in their systematic works, both treated the emotions in a principled and philosophical manner. Having engaged Classical Greek and Hellenistic theories on the emotions, Augustine and Aquinas went on to develop a uniquely Christian understanding of the passiones animae, which, in turn, became paradigmatic for the generations that followed. Focusing on their respective commentaries on the Gospel of John, this essay explains what the passiones animae are and why they were seen as an ethical problem in the patristic and medieval periods. It highlights the connection between Augustine and Aquinas as well as their respective contributions both to the doctrine of affections in general and to Christianity＊s understanding of sorrow in particular.

This paper explores the relationship between philology and literary criticism (on the one hand) and history (on the other) via two (para)-marital problems drawn from Augustine＊s life. The first is historiographical and concerns Augustine＊s relations with Anonyma I, his African concubine, who was featured so famously in the Confessiones. My argument, first published in 2002, that Augustine painted his separation from her in the language of Genesis and saw her as a virtual wife, has not found favor with historians. The episode is used as a test case for comparing the historiographical technique of three Augustine biographers (Bonner, Rosen, Lane Fox). I revisit my reasoning, showing how, sadly, philology and history have grown apart, a phenomenon which, in turn, highlights the need for an increased awareness of and engagement with philology by historians. Philological arguments must be faced and not simply ignored or cherry-picked ad lib. The second problem is historical and prosopographical. Who was the fornicating widower of Epistula 259? In part, I use philological and literary techniques to argue that this widower was indeed Romanianus, and that this letter needs to be dated much earlier than previously thought〞even to as early as 396 and the period of Augustine＊s co-episcopacy. The tone of the letter is key to understanding it properly. In it, we see an affectionate, urbane, and witty Augustine.

One of the most controversial aspects of Augustine＊s political thought is his use of imperial power to coerce religious dissenters. While scholars have sought to situate Augustine＊s justifications of coercion within his historical, social, and political contexts, even the most helpful approaches do not alleviate concerns that Augustine＊s defense of coercion violates individual liberty. This paper argues that one reason for this is that many defenders and detractors tend to view Augustine＊s defense through a largely liberal lens, assuming a modern conception of liberty and legitimacy that is alien to his late antique context. In contrast, this paper highlights how Augustine appropriates republican principles from his Roman predecessors to justify coercion and place limits on its use. In particular, it focuses on Augustine＊s commitments to: (1) liberty as non-domination; (2) legitimate authority and the rule of law as constraints on arbitrary power; and (3) contestability, publicity, and immanent critique as means of preventing domination and holding power accountable. By showing how the content and form of Augustine＊s reasoning align with republican principles, this paper suggests that his defense of coercion appears less inimical to liberty in his Roman context than his modern interpreters typically assume. The paper concludes by considering how this republican approach might help to preserve liberty and prevent domination in our own time.