Jos¨¦ Mar¨ªa Vigil is one of the most radical and critical Mexican republican liberals of the nineteenth century. Heir of a Mexican republican humanist tradition, he questioned the project of a homogeneous nation, vindicated Mexico¡¯s multicultural identity, criticized positivist philosophies as the foundation of the authoritarian state and defended the republican principles of the Mexican Constitution of 1857, in opposition to the scientific and conservative liberalism promoted mainly by Justo Sierra. His work encompasses epistemology, political philosophy, literary criticism and Mexican history. All his work constitutes a republican humanism that influenced the Mexican Revolution of 1910.

This work presents and evaluates some of Jos¨¦ Revueltas¡¯s contributions to Marxist philosophy in Mexico through a critical examination of three works written at different times and under different circumstances during the twentieth century. These works are the lecture ¡°Posibilidades y limitaciones del mexicano,¡± which was delivered in 1950; the novel ¡°Los errores,¡± published in 1964; and the essay ¡°Dial¨¦ctica de la conciencia,¡± written in 1975. Through this analysis, Revueltas¡¯ revolutionary thought is presented here as an indispensable framework to analyze Mexican reality and to its realize potential for revolutionary change.

Luis Villoro was the most important Mexican philosopher of the second half of the twentieth century. Among his many philosophical interests was political philosophy. His studies in this field were always accompanied by his direct involvement in the political affairs of his country. For several decades, Villoro developed a critique of the political regime of the post-Mexican Revolution. His position, for many years, was one of peaceful reform of the regime with the goal of achieving democratic socialism. The uprising of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation in Chiapas changed his conception of politics. From then on, Villoro offered a profound critique of liberal democracy and defended a communitarian democracy inspired by the practices of indigenous peoples.

Claims that socialism is infeasible are pervasive in everyday political discourse. These claims warrant close scrutiny, as they often rely on or suggest implicit arguments that are defective and ideologically loaded. This paper systematically reconstructs and critiques five common types of defective anti-socialist feasibility arguments (DAFAs) found in ordinary communication. In addition to analyzing their argumentative flaws, the paper argues that DAFAs function ideologically in the Marxist-critical sense: they distort social reality such that, in effect, they advance and sustain ruling class interests. Relying on fallacies, unsubstantiated claims, and conceptual imprecision, DAFAs misleadingly cultivate the perception that socialism is definitively unachievable and unworthy of deliberation or pursuit, thereby discouraging collective efforts toward emancipatory change. The paper offers analytical tools for identifying and countering such arguments, equipping radicals to more effectively challenge this form of capitalist ideology.

Pablo Gonz¨¢lez Casanova was a highly influential Mexican intellectual during most of his 101 years of life. He was an exceptional administrator who successfully established two new institutions within the UNAM system, namely a high-school system and a research center. His passion for fostering interdisciplinary collaboration in the fields of science and technology drove these initiatives. This article aims to establish a connection between three key aspects of his theory: internal colonialism, critical thinking within the framework of complex theory, and radical democracy. This paper contends that his concept of radical democracy is crucial in developing internal colonialism and critical thinking in the context of the new sciences and humanities.

This essay explores the life and political philosophy of the Mexican anarchist Ricardo Flores Mag¨®n. It traces his biographical story before diving into his political thought. It focuses on Ricardo Flores Mag¨®n¡¯s anarchism and how it was simultaneously rooted in the history and conditions of Mexico and the Mexican revolution, while also interwoven into the global anarchist movement of which Ricardo Flores Mag¨®n was a part.

This essay presents the philosophical thought of the ninetenth century Mexican liberal journalist and statesman Ignacio Ram¨ªrez, ¡°El Nigromante.¡± Specifically, it shows that Ram¨ªrez embraced in his writings a radical form of naturalism, and that this naturalism led him to defend an associative notion of democracy as well as the view that this form of democracy is the best way to promote individual autonomy. The essay also shows that, for Ram¨ªrez, education is central for people to effectively engage in democratic practices and to promote individual autonomy, and it draws some parallels between the views of Ram¨ªrez and those of John Dewey.

Co-founder of one of the most radical anarcho-syndicalist organizations in the world during the early twentieth century, Reynalda Gonz¨¢lez Parra was a Mexican woman who left an indelible mark on the world of Mexican labor and politics. Building from Mexican and U.S. archival material, this essay centers the lived experience of Gonz¨¢lez Parra who formed part of a vibrant, activist world in the Gulf of Mexico region during the years leading up to the Mexican Revolution and during the civil war. Her own writings in the small but radically powerful anarchist press with reach across the Atlantic as well as across the international border in the United States point to a new vision for a world where socio-economic inequality would be inexistent. I argue that both her philosophy and actual actions on the ground embodied a kind of anarchism that politicized motherhood from the perspective of radical anarcho-syndicalist ideals¡ªthat is, privileging the labor collective as the main unit of organizing¡ªwhich formed part of the greater impulse of revolution that helped to carve a space for women in radical movements.

This paper provides a comparative study of Am¨ªlcar Cabral and Ghassan Kanafani. It defends the thesis that both figures were responding to similar historical junctures. Moreover, it shows that they both converged in terms of how they theorized colonialism. For both thinkers, colonialism can be described as an attempt to halt the history of the colonized. A sustained analysis is provided of what the term ¡®history¡¯ means in this context. It is argued that they intended to speak of history in terms of progress. This in turn led them to argue that the colonized societies were dynamic societies before colonialism. If colonialism attempted to ossify the colonized societies, then anti-colonialism cannot be reduced to a defence of inherited cultural traditions.

There is a growing movement of workers joining together in unions that don¡¯t follow a typical formal recognition with collective bargaining model, yet who are still making meaningful workplace changes. Despite this, the labor literature seems to largely focus on the more recognizable collective bargaining style unions, to its detriment and the detriment of those involved in the labor movement. In this paper, I offer a framework for better recognizing and understanding the diverse union landscape, arguing that we should understand unions as democratically controlled associations of workers that aim to improve their workplace conditions through collective action. Collective bargaining can be a great tool for unions, but it isn¡¯t a necessary feature.

This article offers a defense of Herbert Marcuse¡¯s philosophy of science and technology against pragmatic tendencies prevalent in Marcusean scholarship and critical theory today. These tendencies, exemplified in the work of Andrew Feenberg, himself a former student of Marcuse, commonly include the rejection of Marcuse¡¯s romanticism, utopianism, and metapsychology. I argue that these aspects of Marcuse¡¯s thought should be reevaluated and taken as essential to his overall project. This apologia for Marcuse¡¯s philosophy and vision of radical change is particularized in a sustained examination of the cognitive priority of imagination and the superior objectivity of marginalized experience as working together to provide plausible criteria for science and technology.

This essay is about a dark side of the Enlightenment, uncovering the contributions of notable thinkers from that era to the formation of racial ideologies. I address this dark side especially when it comes to moral philosophy in the Enlightenment. My focus will be on Immanuel Kant, to see how an iconic figure of radical thinking in the Enlightenment was at the same time a creative mind in developing the raciology of white supremacy. I argue that his notion of race, drawn from natural history, not only influenced his anthropology, but also posed an unnoticed challenge for his moral and political philosophy. Furthermore, by delving into the conversation between Kant, on the one side, and Johann Herder and George Forster, on the other side, I hope to dismiss the objection of anachronism in so far as racial thinking is concerned in the eighteenth century.

This paper explores the interrelations between a wide variety of strategies being deployed to take away the political power of the fossil fuel industry. This paper explains why challenging the political power of the industry is a crucial part of work to address the climate crisis. It explains the logics underlying a variety of strategies to challenge that political power. It explores the ways these disparate strategies, even when not coordinated, can undermine the variety of ¡°pillars of support¡± which prop up the industry¡¯s political power. Activists are working on multiple fronts to undermine the fossil fuel industry¡¯s political power. As a participant in this movement myself, I wrote this paper as a way of clarifying the strategic objectives of our movement. I hope that those outside the movement will find its approach to challenging entrenched destructive political agents helpful for understanding this and other struggles.

This essay explores the roles of ideas in progressive social movements, with special attention to ideas rooted in religion. Religion in part because it plays an important role in many social movements, both faith-based and secular. In addition, examining religion can help us understand the role of ideas in movements more generally, for several reasons. First, attention to religion¡¯s role in social movements underlines the importance of the content of ideas ¨C why some resonate and inspire, while others fall flat. Second, religious ideas are often embedded in narratives that connect present events to sacred history or transcendent values. Third, religious ideas are part of popular culture, familiar and ¡°normal¡± to many potential activists. Religious roots can make progressive political proposals less threatening and more palatable. Finally, like all ideology, religious ideas are shaped by material institutions and structures, at the same time they have an influence on these forces.

In this essay, I fill this gap in knowledge by arguing that the central object of Fanonian dialectics is violence (anticolonial guerilla warfare), the achievement of the decolonized Black nation and the eventual creation of a new anti-colonial (Pan-African) world order over and against its dialectical negation: Neo-colonialism via colonial counterinsurgency. Furthermore, I argue that Fanon¡¯s dialectical thought helped lay the basis for the emergence of a new theory of revolution against US empire coined by Huey P. Newton as intercommunalism. The complementarity and conceptual harmony between Fanon¡¯s and Newton¡¯s dialectical thinking about US/colonial empire, counterinsurgency, the imperative of creating new forms of humanism, and the lumpen masses as primary agents in the revolutionary transformation of society comprise what I call the ¡®empire as pacification¡¯ thesis.

State violence against disabled people and Indigenous people as well as disabled Indigenous people has long been endemic in the US. Recent scholarship in philosophy of disability and disability studies rarely addresses the underlying issue that causes such state violence: settler-colonial conceptions of land. The aim of this article is to begin filling this gap in the literature. We detail settler colonial epistemologies and argue that the property relation underwrites operative concepts of accessibility dominant across disability theory. We show how such concepts of accessibility are Lockean and thereby defined terms of the project of settler colonialism. We instead offer an Indigenized account of access, which we term deep access, that does not rely on the notion of Lockean property and that provides a coalitional path for Indigenous futures and disability justice. On our account, decolonization is and must be a deep access measure.

Palestinian rock climbers in the West Bank ascend towering limestone cliffs despite being forcibly dispossessed and targeted by Israeli military and violent settlers. This paper examines their actions from the perspective of Quiet Resistance¡ªa form of resistance where one is motivated by personal reasons to pursue activities that are obstructed by oppression. I explain what Quiet Resistance is, how it differs from political protest, and what makes it distinctively valuable. Then, I explain how Quiet Resistance allows the Palestinian climbers to maintain sources of meaning in life under oppressive circumstances. Further, as a form of symbolic action, it allows the climbers to forge a profound connection to their rightful land.

Karl Marx did write, ¡°The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways, the point is to change it,¡± which in this essay I interpret in the context of his normative thought about overcoming alienation. Reading ¡°thesis eleven¡± in the light of that critical perspective, I maintain that two under-appreciated claims emerge: a central reason to pursue revolutionary change is so that more people have the freedom to engage in interpretation such as philosophy, and it is reasonable for many of us to do some mere interpretation now even if doing so will not foster the kind of change that is admittedly vital.

Authors of two new and different but related books on Herbert Marcuse¡¯s contemporary relevance present their respective arguments and then engage in discussion. Spatializing Marcuse: Critical Theory for Contemporary Times argues that a central problematic in Marcuse¡¯s work¡ªthe containment of social change¡ªis at root a spatial problematic. Walker undertakes the unexplored geographical elements of Marcuse¡¯s thought. The Revolutionary Ecological Legacy of Herbert Marcuse¡ªThe Ecosocialist EarthCommonWealth Project is a praxis-oriented appeal to those engaged in a range of contemporary social justice struggles. It is keyed to what we are struggling for, not just what we are struggling against. Each author develops revolutionary alternatives to the present system. Ultimately, what intertwines both works is the presentation of a new Marcuse.

Georg Luk¨¢cs was one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century, his early Marxist work History and Class Consciousness (HCC) of 1923 being considered a hallmark of Critical Theory. But does it still offer, one century after its first publication, productive tools to analyze capitalist societies? To answer this question, we must first untangle the conceptual labyrinth in which the book¡¯s main categories have been enmeshed. To contribute to this end, this paper examines the cogency of Luk¨¢cs¡¯s later self-criticism (implicit in The Young Hegel and explicit in his 1967 critical preface to HCC) that his early concept of reification conflates the phenomena of alienation and objectification and thereby leads to an acritical and idealist view of capitalism. Our conclusion is that the self-criticism does not hold insofar as the theoretical framework developed in HCC involves an approach to the relation between subject and object that is much more sophisticated than understanding reification merely as the former turning into the latter.

In this paper I discuss Luk¨¢cs¡¯s lecture ¡°Functional Change of Historical Materialism¡± as a programmatic text that only rarely receives attention, offering an analysis that shows a connection with Horkheimer¡¯s equally programmatic and well known 1931 lecture on ¡°The Present Situation of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute for Social Research.¡± I show that an absolute focus on the reification essay alone is just as problematic as reducing Luk¨¢cs to an orthodox dogmatist. Above all, it should become clear that and to what extent a research institute that operates in the spirit of Luk¨¢cs could¡ªand should¡ªhave represented an alternative to the research institutions we know.

Lukacs¡¯ analysis of reification is potentially fruitful for analyzing structural (or institutional) violence as well as cultural or symbolic violence. But he did not make an explicit theme of such violence. Thanks to the neglect of violence, Lukacs did not explore the politics of nonviolence. Perhaps this reflects the secondary place of violence and nonviolence in the tradition of working class politics on which he drew. The later emergence of anti-colonial politics (for example, as theorized by Gandhi and Fanon) included a more explicit focus on violence and nonviolence, as did evolving anti-racist and feminist struggles. While in the meantime many such movements have typically retreated from (or even questioned) the more systematic focus of anti-capitalism and the construction of socialism, they have developed violence as a more explicit and politically relevant theme. In pursuing these themes, I hope to show that Lukacs¡¯ critique of reification can identify and help challenge the structural violence that is imposed by the expansive commodification of capitalist economies. Doing so requires that we attend to functions of symbolic activity in experience generally as well as more specifically in contexts of violence. Elaborating on some of the philosophical aspects of this claim is the task of the first section of this paper. From there I will turn to themes of symbolic activity that are useful for social theory and then proceed to conceptions of violence and of power. These themes bear on the problem of compromised agency that figures prominently in Lukacs¡¯ thought.

This paper develops an understanding of climate denial as an expression of alienation in the sense described by Marx. We first argue for an expanded and differentiated conception of climate denial, theorizing four distinct types that go beyond the simple rejection of an anthropogenic warming trend: naturalist denialism, technological denialism, gradualist denialism, and politicized denialism. We then claim that these forms of climate denial illustrate and are illustrative of Marx¡¯s concept of alienation from species-being (Gattungswesen). The article is intended as a contribution to the growing literature on climate denial as a social and ideological problem rather than as an individual epistemic or moral issue.

In this remembrance essay I reflect on my 17 years of friendship and apprenticeship with Charles W. Mills. I focus on Mills¡¯s ¡°Black Radical Kantianism,¡± (2018) situating it in light of his earlier work on Kant, history of philosophy, political philosophy, and race, and demonstrating the lasting impact of Mills¡¯s work especially on Kant Studies and Kantian moral-legal-political philosophy. In this analysis, I both acknowledge Mills¡¯s radicalization of Kantianism as a major win toward making white supremacy visible in Kant Studies and political philosophy and remain skeptical of Mills¡¯s strategy of revising liberalism and especially Kantianism for reparative justice projects. After all, holding multiple and seemingly contradictory truths at once is something I have learned from Charles, as it will become clear.

In this article, I seek to contribute to the recent philosophical interest in the phenomenon of narco-culture. I build on the intervention initiated by Carlos Alberto S¨¢nchez¡¯s A Sense of Brutality: Philosophy after Narco-Culture (2020) by articulating the spiritually ¡°generative¡± aspects of violence. For this endeavor, I turn to the French philosopher Ren¨¦ Girard, whose work audaciously understands community-building and the maintenance of social order as a violent process of sacralization. This conception of violence then permits me to challenge some of S¨¢nchez¡¯s interpretations of the violence and brutality of narco-culture. My argument is that any comprehensive analysis of the narco-world, just as any other existential option, must consider the spiritual component that, in Girard¡¯s terms, can be expressed as a search for the sacred.

As genealogy has gained greater disciplinary recognition over the last two decades, it has become increasingly common to call any historically oriented philosophy, such as Theodor W. Adorno¡¯s, ¡°genealogy.¡± In this article, I show that Adorno¡¯s philosophy performs genealogy¡¯s defining functions of ¡°problematization¡± and ¡°possibilization.¡± Moreover, it does so in unique ways that constitute a significant contribution to genealogical practice. Adorno¡¯s method, here called ¡°tragic genealogy,¡± is particularly well-suited to the genealogical analysis of traditional philosophical problems and to the critical reanimation of declining, but ethically significant, values. Nevertheless, I also argue that Adorno¡¯s philosophy cannot be assimilated into genealogical practice without rejecting or revising some of its Hegelian influences, particularly its philosophy of history and its modal metaphysics.

The author argues that Quijano¡¯s conceptualization of race within the theory of coloniality of power is limited and theoretically insufficient given its lack of elaboration regarding the role of anti-Blackness in Spanish colonization. This article contrasts the idea of coloniality of power with Cedric Robinson¡¯s elaboration of racial capitalism to demonstrates how Robinson has a more complex and historically rich analysis of race that centers the expansion of racial capitalism with the invention of the Negro subject. The article closes with an attempt to bridge the history of anti-Blackness and the idea of coloniality using Sylvia Wynter¡¯s adaptation of the idea of coloniality, which is attentive to the Portuguese expeditions prior to Columbus and how coloniality disproportionally affected people of African descent in the Am¨¦ricas.

In recent years, Rosi Braidotti has proposed to explore the ¡°intersectionality¡± of natural, social and technological determinations in order to provide a non-dualistic theoretical framework for what she defines as the ¡°critical posthumanities.¡± In this paper, I polemically engage with Braidotti¡¯s theoretical project by reconstructing the methodological principle through which she endeavors to disentangle the dualisms presupposed by anthropocentrism and humanism. I will argue that the upshot of this methodological procedure is a hypostatization of subjective structures into reality which in turn facilitates an ontological transposition of the political concept of inclusiveness. In highlighting the formal procedure of inclusion by which the posthuman subject conceptualizes difference, this article provides a set of objections to Braidotti¡¯s methodology by evaluating it in terms of the Marxian critique of speculative abstractions.

This paper discusses two thinkers who locate the possibility of revolutionary historical change in political projects oriented toward the formation of subjects and cultivation of sensibility. I begin by considering the relationship between historical violence and education in the works of Walter Benjamin. After introducing the provocative association of education with divine violence found in ¡°Toward the Critique of Violence,¡± I expand on Benjamin¡¯s conception of pedagogical force. Highlighting the centrality of education in Benjamin¡¯s early work, I argue that his account of learning does not depend on the mastery of students by teachers, nor more generally on the mastery of objective reality by a sovereign subject, but on the mastery of the educational relationship by tradition. Drawing on W.?E.?B. Du Bois¡¯s discussion of the abolition of slavery, I close by describing the revolutionary cultivation of sensibility as a dynamic and collectively achieved mode of historical learning.

This paper, inspired by Duke University historian Nancy MacLean¡¯s extraordinary book Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right¡¯s Stealth Plan for America (2017), elaborates the carefully calibrated, multifaceted plan by a billionaire-funded facet of the radical right, deeply disturbed by the fact that so many students have critical views of capitalism, to transform American universities. Its multi-pronged strategy involves the following three steps: (1) Reconfigure the financial superstructure of higher education. Cut public funding for higher education and fill the gap with strategic donor giving. (2) Purge and Recruit: remove left-leaning faculty, develop a counter-intelligentsia of libertarian faculty, and foster the creation of libertarian student organizations on campus. (3) Undermine the general public¡¯s respect for and trust in our colleges and universities by manufacturing controversies that attract widespread attention. This paper examines each of these in detail, with particular attention given to the myriad of privately funded institutional ¡°think tanks¡± involved in the process.

In Theory of the Partisan, Carl Schmitt outlines a theory of the history of the partisan beginning in 1808, when the Spanish guerilla defeated Napoleon. After that modern nation states began to integrate guerilla war tactics in their strategies. According to Schmitt, this development was intensified during the 20th century, but in a dangerous manner. Arguably, Russia¡¯s actions in Ukraine 2014 and 2022 suggest that Schmitt¡¯s conception is still relevant for understanding extreme political situations. But why do sovereign states need the partisan? The big loser in this development, however, is the partisan himself, who gets exploited and instrumentalized by regular political actors. Even if Schmitt advocates a less extreme way of using the partisan, he arguably helps placing it under the rule of state actors, a tactic Putin¡¯s Russia deploys in action. Therefore, a political rehabilitation of the partisan from its exploitation is very needed.

The narrow-the-scope proposal for defining racism posits that a narrow definition is preferable to a wide definition because the former better facilitates interracial dialogue. Important critiques of the narrow-the-scope proposal have so far focused on the content of narrow definitions. This paper argues that it is important to critique the use of narrow definitions, as well. An examination of white uses of the term ¡°racism¡± reveals that narrow definitions tend to be interchangeable with individualist definitions, as individualism is an effective framework for white co-optation in the service of white interests. Consequently, philosophers interested in theorizing racism for racial justice purposes ought to reject the narrow-the-scope proposal. Individualist forms of racism should be accommodated within a wide conception of racism that centers the phenomenon of white racism.

Here I both celebrate and critique the legacy of Charles W. Mills. I begin by offering some reflections on the trajectory of Mills¡¯s career and intellectual development, focusing on his move from Marxist philosophy to the philosophy of race. I then attempt to undermine an argument in Mills¡¯s final book, for why those interested in emancipation should choose liberalism over Marxism. By contrasting Mills with the late Italian Marxist philosopher of history Domenico Losurdo, with whom Mills shared a blistering critique of ¡®racial¡¯ liberalism but whom I claim Mills misread, I seek to weaken key premises in Mills¡¯s argument.

This paper revisits an aspect of Charles Mills¡¯s work that is usually overlooked, namely, his early engagement with the tradition of analytical Marxism, particularly in From Class to Race: Essays in White Marxism and Black Radicalism (2003). This collection of essays is important not only because it marks Mills¡¯s intellectual trajectory, but also because, as I aim to show in the following, it allows us to trace the source of Mills¡¯s radicalism. I argue that Mills¡¯s radicalism locates the causal source of social change in the material conditions of oppression. I then show how this analysis of Mills¡¯s radicalism can help in clarifying his critique of ideal theory and his insistence on the importance of nonideal theory. I end by considering the relation between class and racial oppression in Mills¡¯s early Marxist work.

Charles Mills¡¯s philosophical work provides a standpoint from which white philosophers can engage philosophical questions about race by demonstrating that the concept of race is relevant to the study of Western political philosophy, by developing the critical concept of white supremacy, and by critiquing the failure of liberal political philosophy to address the history of race-based chattel slavery in the US and the British empire. Nonetheless, the social contractarian methodology of Mills¡¯s philosophical work is flawed because of its individualistic social ontology, its reliance on structured ignorance rather than situated knowledge to attain objective knowledge about society, and its inability to fulfill its promise to generate a generalized account of race-related injustice that applies to all societies at all times.

I examine how James Baldwin explored white ignorance¡ªas conceived by Charles Mills¡ªin his work. I argue that Baldwin helps us understand Mills¡¯s account of white ignorance more deeply, showing that while only mentioned briefly by Mills, Baldwin provides fruitful insights into the phenomenon. I also consider the resources Baldwin provides to find a way out of white ignorance. My aim is to link these thinkers in ways that have been largely ignored.

This is a memorial essay on how the life and work of Charles W. Mills influenced my development as a Black philosopher. Employing Mills¡¯s use of the Jamaican creole term smadditizin¡¯¡ªmeaning ¡°becoming recognized as somebody in a world where, primarily because of race, it is denied¡±¡ªI trace how Mills helped me become a human self myself. Inspired by using his books as texts in courses I taught, and working with him in the Radical Philosophy Association, I learned what it means to be an engaged philosopher. This essay also explores the controversy surrounding radical Black liberalism as a means for attaining personhood. Finally, I defend Mills as a canonical radical philosopher who never wavered from his fierce anti-colonialist, anti-white supremacist, and anti-capitalist stances.

Charles Mills adhered to the highest standards of philosophical scholarship, while seeing his work firmly as a contribution to the cause of social justice. He had a deep appreciation for historical context and a history of ideas approach to racial/philosophical questions. He was one of the foremost Rawls interpreters or our time, though only a few years before his passing was he so recognized. He channeled his analytic training in his habit of demonstrating how a view is strengthened when an author shows how objections can be systematically replied to. I wish he had tried to integrate class and race into a larger theoretical system, of both an explanatory and normative character. Class is sometimes an unnoted presence in his explanation of white supremacy. Charles saw himself contributing to a collective scholarly social justice project and was happy to acknowledge the greater expertise of others in allied areas to his.

In memoriam and ongoing engagement, I begin with my earlier critical interpretation and a reinterpretation that shows how Mills was prescient, given the recrudescence of white supremacy now daily evident in the United States. This leads to an historical analysis of the racial contract as the racist contract and of the racist contract as the racist compact. The racist compact endures in society, outside of government, but protected by democracy. This creates backlash and obstruction to progress that progressives often fail to predict. Influenced by Mills and through a shift in his emphases, I propose humanitarianism. Global ideas of humanitarianism bypass nonwhite racial identities are more general than them, and they bypass the white supremacist racial conceptual scheme of hierarchical races.

As Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell have observed, de-moralization¡ªthe retreat of normative regulation from specific areas of human life¡ªrepresents an under-theorized component of the study of moral change. However, Buchanan and Powell, like Philip Kitcher, focus exclusively on instances of de-moralization that they regard as morally progressive. Indeed, the existing literature on moral change is almost silent on the matter of moral regression, and doubly so on the matter of regressive de-moralization. This paper attempts to define and defend a particular, contractualist account of regressive de-moralization as both historically well-documented and a matter of contemporary concern.

In this article, the author argues that anti-colonial Marxism has been obscured and distorted by the contemporary post-Cold War imaginary. The author analyzes the historical-political context in which the narrative of Marxism and decolonization develop during and after the Cold War. Focusing on the writings of Frantz Fanon, Am¨ªlcar Cabral, Thomas Sankara, and Ernesto ¡°Che¡± Guevara, the author reconstructs the ¡°principles¡± of anti-colonial Marxism, attempting to ameliorate the scholarly deficit of theoretical literature on the anti-colonial Marxist tradition. In conclusion, the author argues that the ¡°revolutionary theory¡± of these thinkers remains relevant to persistent, present-day conditions of neocolonialism and capitalist imperialism, becoming increasingly relevant with the progression of catastrophic climate change.

In the United States, Protestant Christian identity is the dominant religious identity. Protestant Christian identity confers status privileges, yet also creates objectionable status inequalities. Historical and contemporary evidence includes the unfair treatment of Mormons, Native Americans, Muslims, and other religious minorities. Protestant Christian supremacy also plays a significant role in bolstering anti LGBTQ prejudice, xenophobia, and white supremacy. Ways that Protestant Christian identity correlates with objectionable status inequalities are often neglected in contemporary political philosophy. This paper aims to make a modest contribution towards filling that gap. Some forms of inequality linked to Protestant Christian supremacy can be characterized as domination and oppression. Other instances include barriers to fair equality of opportunity for self-determination. Adapting ideas from egalitarian political philosophy I propose an analysis of objectionable status inequality rooted in Protestant Christian supremacy. Alan Patten¡¯s defense of an egalitarian principle for assessing the effects of law and policy is helpful for this task.

This essay elaborates on Rodolfo Corky Gonzales¡¯s ¡°Yo soy Joaqu¨ªn¡± as an inter-American articulation of the critical commitments of Chicanismo, which is here identified as the sociopolitical philosophy and ideological/normative leanings of Mexican Americans who call(ed) themselves Chicanas/os. The purpose of this essay is to show both how syncretism frames Chicanismo as a philosophy of growth and identity beyond borders and that this worldview can be critically explained as seeking alliances to communities and contexts defined by struggle. It engages the historical groundwork, philosophical influences on, and cultural ideals and values voiced through this poem by proponents of Chicanismo among its multiple forms and various representatives.

Leftist political theory remains trapped between two dominant conceptions of sovereignty: the liberal conception of popular sovereignty and the decisionist conception of sovereignty as the power to declare a state of exception. This essay offers a historical critique of the liberal and decisionist conceptions of sovereignty and develops a descriptive theory of aristocratic sovereignty, which is more suited to the history and the needs of radical political theory and praxis. By tracing the genealogy of sovereignty through early modern European political thought to the founding of the United States, this essay reveals the debilitating shortcoming of notions of sovereignty derived from both Carl Schmitt and the liberal tradition and provides a basis for a distinctively radical analysis of the sovereign aristocracy in Amerika.

I argue that while recognition is important for Middle Eastern and North African philosophers in academia and society, recognition alone should not define the anti-colonial movement. BDS provides a better model of engagement because it constructs identities in order to bring about material changes in the academy and beyond. In the first part of the essay, I catalog how MENA thought traditions have been and continue to be suppressed within the academy and philosophy in particular. I then sketch one possible path to better representation in philosophy by reading Fayez Sayegh¡¯s analyses of Zionist colonialism and Palestinian non-being. In the second half of the essay, I argue that BDS is among the premier anti-colonial movements on American campuses today because it is a materialist anti-racist movement. Insofar as that movement is often shunned and prohibited, an anti-colonial society offers a membership in exile.

Humanities advocates focus on demonstrating the humanities¡¯ value to encourage participation. This advocacy is largely done through institutional means, and rarely taken directly to the public. This article argues that by reframing the theory of Direct Action, humanities advocates can effectively engage the public. The article begins by exploring three different understandings of the humanities: that they develop good citizenship, that they develop understanding, and that they develop critical thought. The article then discusses what Direct Action is and how it works. The article concludes by describing how to reframe Direct Action to suit the needs of the humanities, including potential actions that will achieve those ends. Humanities Direct Action must be seen as a debate and will focus on increasing critical thinking.

In this article, I explore the contrast between the recent George Floyd protests and the lockdowns immediately prior by situating these rebellions in the context of Foucault¡¯s disciplinary society and subsequent scholarship on biopolitical management. I assert that the disciplinary mechanisms operative in finance/debt, policing and epidemiological management of the virus share similar epistemological assumptions stemming from liberal individualism. The revolutionary character of these uprisings therefore stems from their epistemological subversions of the predictable individual, and this figure¡¯s spatiotemporal situatedness, a construction that helps power make claims on our collective future. The protests push us to see beyond a strict Foucauldian reading of this moment to uncover the metastatic status of identities in rebellion, which sustain resistance to disciplinary society¡¯s epistemological foundations.

What forms of collective political action conceivably might offer the best prospects for radical, transformative change in the context of a planet currently in crisis, and characterized by intersecting struggles for environmental, economic, social, and racial justice? The concept of radical subjectivity that Herbert Marcuse developed throughout his life and work can provide social movement theorists, organizations and activists with valuable theoretical and practical resources to identify, encourage, and further develop new and emerging forms of political agency and activism, and thereby contribute to the mobilization of contemporary social movements seeking to address these crises and their underlying causes. This concept, when critically reevaluated and appropriated in light of more recent insights about the nature of subjectivity and political agency as well as in the context of these contemporary struggles, can assist in the development of a theory and practice that might be adequate to address the multiple global crises currently confronting humanity and other forms of life on Earth.

How should we conceptualize direct action against climate change? Although direct action is an increasingly significant tactic by the global climate movement, we lack understanding how direct action contributes to the systemic change necessary for addressing the crisis. Drawing upon critical theories of climate change as a crisis in the social reproduction of the metabolic relations between humans and nature in capitalism, I conceptualize direct action as attempts to intervene directly in the organization of the social metabolism, towards reorganizing these relations in a more socially just and ecologically sustainable manner. My framework thus expands and clarifies the scope and potential of direct action as a means of confronting the capitalist climate crisis, as evidenced by Greta Thunberg¡¯s school strike for climate.

I argue that environmental ignorance is a group-based form of substantive ignorance that is analogous to race-based ignorance, showing that they are structurally and functionally similar and sometimes overlap. While race theorists offer promising solutions toward eliminating race-based ignorance, I argue that something far more is needed in the environmental case. I turn to panpsychism as a possible solution. Though I conclude that it is too radical for most Americans to willingly embrace, I incorporate a notion of ¡°encounter¡± to argue that an expanded conception of home helps with the conceptual overhaul needed to overcome environmental ignorance.

This article addresses the place of situationist ideas in the current drive to make meaningful social and political change to avoid the catastrophic consequences of climate change. After a brief review of some key situationist concepts, the article shows how situationist thinkers post-1968 saw the prospect of environmental degradation as one of the key consequences of the social apathy induced by the spectacle and the grim prospects for the prevailing liberal assemblage of power to address the problem. The article concludes by briefly discussing the place of a situationist-inspired environmentalism in the larger debates about radical solutions to climate change.

What if we fail to mitigate and adapt to climate change, and so face its more severe impacts? I argue that asking this question reveals a new obligation of climate justice: contingency planning for severe climate change. Surprisingly, such plans are already being drafted. But the politics behind them is neoliberal and militarist. I identify the epistemology of futurity motivating contingency planning¡ªpossibilism¡ªand argue that we can and should dissociate it from, and redeploy it against, neoliberal militarism.

The alt-right is an online subculture marked by its devotion to the execution of a racist, misogynistic, and xenophobic politics through trolling, pranking, meme-making, and mass murder. It is this devotion to far-right politics through the discordant conjunction of humor and suicidal violence this article seeks to explain by situating the movement for the first time within its constitutive online relationships. This article adds to the existing literature by viewing the online relationships of the alt-right through the genealogy of propaganda. Through situating the alt-right alongside the genealogy of propaganda, the article offers new insights into the social isolation, increasingly extreme social and political positions, nihilism, and violence that have emerged within the alt-right. The article concludes by applying the lessons of the alt-right for online organizing across the political spectrum and argues that a class-based politics of the left is an important part of countering the rise of the alt-right.

In Autopoiesis and Cognition (1980), Humberto R. Maturana and Franscico J. Varela state that ¡°the way an autopoietic system maintains its identity depends on its particular way of being autopoietic, that is, on its particular structure, different classes of autopoietic systems have different classes of ontogenies¡± (98). With this in mind, in this article I develop how this conception of autopoietic systems is both present in, and operates through, Wynter¡¯s employment of space and place, poetry, and wonder.

Many fear that climate change will lead to the collapse of civilization. I argue both that this is unlikely and that the fear is potentially harmful. Using examples from recent disasters I argue that climate change is more likely to intensify the existing social order¡ªa truly terrifying prospect. The fear of civilizational collapse is part of the climate crisis; it makes us fear change and prevents us from imagining different social relations which is necessary if we are to survive the coming disasters and prevent further escalation. Using affect theory, I claim that our visions of the future affect our ability to act in the present. Rather than imagining a terrifying societal breakdown, we can look at how communities have survived recent disasters to get an image of what we need to expand upon to prepare for the future.

In his essay ¡°Critique of Violence,¡± Walter Benjamin argued that only certain types of strikes can be considered revolutionary, while others¡ªi.e., most bread and butter, or ¡°political¡± strikes¡ªtacitly rely on the violent logics of the state. This paper suggests, however, that by reading Benjamin against himself and applying his discussion of ¡°pure means¡± to those ¡°political¡± strikes, the extent to which even these basic collective actions represent effective ¡°strategies of resistance¡± becomes evident. This framework requires an interdisciplinary approach to radical labor studies, combining political theory with history in order to identify and analyze past instances of joyful community-building during strikes. Relying also on a historical case study¡ªthe 1926 miners¡¯ lockout in South Wales¡ªand Benjamin¡¯s own writings on the discipline of history, this paper contends that strikes, and the ¡°alternative communities¡± they encourage workers and their families to build, present enormous revolutionary potential. When theory and history are studied together, and when we pay close attention to the actual tactics of solidarity that make up strike actions, this potential is uncovered.

This article seeks to develop a concept I term surveillant citizenship, referring to a historically-emergent civic national and moral discourse that prescribes citizen participation in surveillance, policing, and law enforcement. Drawing on philosophy of race, surveillance studies, critical prison studies, and cultural theory, I argue that the ideological projects attached to the ¡®War on Crime¡¯ and the ¡®War on Drugs¡¯ sought to choreograph white social life around surveillant citizenship¡ªmanufacturing consent to police militarization, prison expansion, and mass incarceration, with consequences relevant to the future of antiracist strategy.

This essay examines the poem ¡°Angelitos Negros¡± as a description of social inequity underlain by Latin-American histories of colonialism. Following Nancy Fraser, I analyze the poem as an illustration of the perils of embracing ¡°identity politics¡± separated from redistributive claims. As Fraser notices, contemporary critique is often content elevating identity struggles to the foreground while simultaneously pushing wealth redistribution to the background. In this light, the paper concludes proposing the Zapatista revolution as an example of a movement whereby claims of identity and redistribution have been successfully combined to produce social change in a manner that responds to the issues that ¡°Angelitos Negros¡± evinces.

A central challenge common to democratic processes is the inability of citizens to reach agreement on any given matter. Most frequently these disagreements are settled by vote, victory going to the majority. But majority rule is a fairly recent technique. Traditionally decisions were made by some form of non-opposition. This paper describes several versions of that decision-making technique and then shows how mediation methods, also known as ¡°ADR¡± (Alternative Dispute Resolution), can replicate these traditional ways of overcoming disagreement. The paper argues that these techniques are frequently superior to electoral methods of reaching agreement.

The colonial process constituted a twofold catastrophe. On the one hand, the genocide and enslavement of racialized bodies, along with the large-scale destruction of their lands was a material, or physical, catastrophe. On the other hand, colonialism led to a reconfiguring of intersubjectivities which constituted a ¡°metaphysical catastrophe¡± according Puerto Rican philosopher Nelson Maldonado-Torres. This metaphysical catastrophe relegates the racialized subject beneath the zones of being and non-being leading to dehumanization and permanent war. This text intends to illuminate ways in which analectical marronage, as an existential state of Being, resists this twofold catastrophe brought about by the imperial enterprise.

As we witness the collapse of the neoliberal consensus and the subsequent rise of authoritarian ¡®strong men¡¯ and xenophobic nationalisms across the globe, the capitalist hegemony that was consolidated by the neoliberal project remains very much intact. In pursuit of a sane alternative to this post-neoliberal world order this article proposes love as a key concept for political theory/philosophy and for performing a central role in the revolutionary transformation of contemporary global capitalism. Through a close reading of the works of Emma Goldman and Michael Hardt, and specifically their own pursuit of a political concept of love¡ªI draw on, and make links with contemporary ideas of love as a political concept for radical social transformation in the twenty-first century. I argue that new love-based political subjectivities, practices, and group formations offer exciting opportunities for a reimagining of the frame within which an alter-globalisation can occur, and link theory to praxis by introducing an ongoing Collective Visioning project which illuminates a new post-capitalist, post-patriarchal, post-colonial and post-anthropocentric synergetic politics grounded in revolutionary love.

In Climate Leviathan, Mann and Wainwright address the political implications of climate change by theorizing four possible planetary futures: Climate Leviathan as capitalist planetary sovereignty, Climate Mao as non-capitalist planetary sovereignty, Climate Behemoth as capitalist non-planetary sovereignty, and Climate X as non-capitalist non-planetary sovereignty. The authors of the present article agree that the depth and scale of destabilizations induced by climate change cannot be navigated justly from within the present social-political-economic system. We disagree, however, on which of the non-capitalist orientations is better suited for generating viable alternatives to the worst dystopian futures. The article thus stages a debate to elucidate the theoretical and political divergence between Climate X and Climate Mao (renamed Climate Jacobin).

In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges. Although I concur that same-sex couples should have the right to marry if anyone does, I argue that civil marriage is an unjust institution. By examining the claims employed in the majority opinion, I expose the Court¡¯s romanticized, patriarchal view of marriage. I critique four central claims: (1) that marriage is central to individual autonomy and liberty; (2) that civil marriage is uniquely valuable; (3) that marriage ¡°safeguards¡± children and families; and (4) that marriage is fundamental to civil society.

We argue that violent political protest is justified in a generally just society when violence is required to send a message about the nature of the injustice at issue, and when it is not ruled out by moral or pragmatic considerations. Focusing on protest as a mode of public address, we argue that its communicative function can sometimes justify or require the use of violence. The injustice at the heart of the Baltimore protests¡ªpolice brutality against black Americans¡ªis a paradigmatic case of this sort, because of the rela?tionship of the police to the injustice and the protests against it.

In this article I tease out a conception of reason in Pierre-Joseph Proudhon¡¯s writings that is both decoupled from Enlightenment notions of human nature, progress, and transcendental truth, as well as auto-critically engaged with the anti-authoritarian Enlightenment ethos of anarchist thought. In so doing, I hope to reveal how the Proudhonian deployment of reason retained a healthy skepticism of foundationalism, philosophical systems-building, and the intellectualism bred of its dogmatic excesses as well as reconsider Proudhon¡¯s relation to our most privileged faculty.

This paper critically examines violence, and our shared responsibility for it. Drawing on insights from Jean-Paul Sartre, I develop the correlation between scarcity and violence, emphasizing scarcity as agential lack that results from conditions of oppression and domination. In order to develop this correlation between scarcity and violence, I examine the racial dimension of violence in the U.S. Following this analysis, I claim that we all share responsibility for the social structural processes in which we participate that produce scarcity. On these grounds, I argue for the imperative of democratic equality, i.e., conditions for the self-development and self-determination of all.

In this article, I argue that justice is necessarily inapplicable to the global scale, since there is no such thing as a global society in the proper sense. I examine why this is so, and criticize two types of arguments for global justice¡ªmaximalist conceptions (such as those of Charles Beitz and Allen Buchanan) that argue for a robust notion of redistribution on the global scale, and minimalist conceptions (such as those of Thomas Pogge and Iris Young) that argue for a notion of redress or solidarity across borders.

The Correctional Service of Canada is currently re-instituting animal-based agribusiness programs in two federal penitentiaries. To situate the contemporary function of such programs, I provide a historical overview of prison agriculture in relation to Canadian nation-making. I argue that?penitentiary?farms have?functioned?as a means of prison?expansion and settler territorialisation.?While support for agricultural programming is rooted in its perceived facilitation of rehabilitation and vocational training, I show that these justifications are untenable. Rather the prison farm ought to be viewed as an institution made possible by and that reproduces, settler colonial power relations to animals, labour, and territory. Prison agribusiness is then an expression of colonial, agricultural, and carceral powers.

In the United States today, much interpersonal racism is driven by corrupt forms of self-preservation. Drawing from Jean-Jacques Rousseau, I refer to this as self-love racism. The byproduct of socially-induced racial anxieties and perceived threats to one¡¯s physical or social wellbeing, self-love racism is the protective attachment to the racialized dimensions of one¡¯s social status, wealth, privilege, and/or identity. Examples include police officer related shootings of unarmed Black Americans, anti-immigrant sentiment, and the resurgence of unabashed white supremacy. This form of racism is defined less by the introduction of racism into the world and more on the perpetuation of racially unjust socioeconomic and political structures. My theory, therefore, works at the intersection of the interpersonal and structural by offering an account of moral complacency in racist social structures. My goal is to reorient the directionality of philosophical work on racism by questioning the sense of innocence at the core of white ways-of-being.

This article examines Alain Badiou¡¯s and Slavoj ?i?ek¡¯s advocacy for fidelity to revolutionary truths in light of complex system theory¡¯s understanding of resiliency. It begins with a discussion of how Badiou and ?i?ek describe truth. Next, it looks at the features that make a complex system resilient. The article argues that if we understand neoliberalism as a resilient system, then the fidelity to revolutionary truths that Badiou and ?i?ek advocate is not enough, for it doesn¡¯t realize how truths come from the system as a whole. The article concludes by describing how this viewpoint alters discussions of political change.

I begin by briefly reconstructing Honneth¡¯s concept of reification. His paradigm gives the reification of the non-human environment a marginal position in comparison to the reification of human beings, thereby detracting from its explanatory and critical potential. In order to avoid this outcome, I subsequently present a paradigm of subject identity formation in which not only affectively-based intersubjective interactions but also affectively-based interactions with the non-human environment are, in both a ¡°genetic¡± and a ¡°conceptual¡± sense, essential to establish an objective and meaningful relationship with external reality. On the basis of this paradigm a closer connection can be identified between the reification of human beings and the reification of the non-human environment¡ªa connection in which the reification of the latter may reinforce human reification (and vice versa).

Marcuse argues that society must be evaluated in terms of its unrealized potentialities. Potentialities are formulated by the imagination, which has an essential cognitive function in revealing what things might be. Utopian thinking, thinking that transcends the given facts toward their potentialities, is thus rational in Marcuse¡¯s view. His explanation for this claim draws on Hegel, Marx, and phenomenology. With Freud, Marcuse elaborates the historical limits and possibilities of the imagination as an expression of Eros. Utopia is the historical realization in a refashioned world of the rational contents of the imagination.

While the decolonial turn calls into question the broad structure of Western knowledge projects, it also suggests an investigation of the central objects and categories of these projects. This study undertakes this latter investigation in relation to Marxist theory. Starting from the work of Frantz Fanon and contemporary theorists of coloniality, I consider three central figures in the Marxian critique of capital: enclosure, valorization, and real subsumption. Interrogating familiar and heterodox accounts of these figures, my analysis exposes an architecture of injury that comprehends the structure of value and that articulates a process of extended violation working beyond the dialectic.

This paper tackles an old, yet persisting philosophical and cultural imaginary that justifies the political subjugation, marginalization and exclusion of distant others through claims that such people are less advanced and cognitively inferior, and therefore remain at the periphery of moral and political considerations of Western political culture. My premise here is that all knowledge is historically conditioned, and as such serves as a discursive formation that mirrors and sustains specific historical forms of social organization and practices. Thus, by considering the interrelated themes of epistemic and social inclusion (and exclusion) of refugees and migrants from a range of critical philosophical perspectives, I argue that successfully managing the dire humanitarian circumstances involved in admitting and receiving displaced and migrant people requires the inclusion of both the bodies of knowledge and discursive interactions (i.e., epistemic inclusion) and also diverse social and cultural perspectives (i.e., social inclusion).

Liberation philosophy was born from radical, socialist roots. Yet recent developments by major figures in the tradition, including Enrique Dussel, would appear to position the movement unhelpfully closer to liberalism. The present article argues that this is a misconception, and that Liberation philosophy rather suggests a new ideal for conceptions of political justice, one that also helpfully avoids a number of common objections that dog traditional socialist proposals. The work of John Rawls is used as a dialogical counter point to suggest the relative merits for the new approach Liberation philosophy suggest for socialism.

In this paper I argue that Nancy Fraser¡¯s theory of social reproduction is misleading and that the process of exploitation is more central to women¡¯s oppression than Fraser¡¯s theory suggests. I argue that Fraser¡¯s theory of women¡¯s oppression is continuous with her theory of capitalism and political agency. I critique Fraser¡¯s theory of capitalism at a structural level to clarify some of the ambiguity in her position about the difference between production and reproduction. I then compare Fraser¡¯s view with a structural view of class to make my critique and extend it to her theoretical distinction between status and class.

The paper reflects on the methods democratic systems use for arriving at decisions. The most popular ones are elections where the majority rules and deliberative democracy. I argue that both of these do not measure up to the demands of democracy. Whether we use voting with majority rule or deliberative methods, only a portion of the citizenry is allowed to rule itself; minorities are always excluded. Instead of voting with majority ruler or deliberative methods, I suggest that we employ mediation (ADR) to reach agreement in democratic publics.

Instead of understanding property and rationality individualistically as in capitalism, the ecological crisis makes it imperative that we change the priority to the social/collective point of view. Public goods/commonstock should be the default, and private property should have to be justified. Rationality should be understood not primarily from an individual perspective, but from a social/collective point of view. This does not entail the sacrifice of individual rights and freedom to the collective, but rather the synthesis of the two. Planning and freedom coincide if the planning is democratic, which can only happen in a more egalitarian society.

Extreme monetary policies successfully prevented the ¡°Great Recession¡± of 2007¨C2009 from turning into a global depression. However, they did not address the underlying problems in global capitalism. In recent years prominent ¡°insiders¡± of global capitalism have proposed reforms designed to remedy these defects. I argue that these proposals are inadequate, due in great part to a failure to acknowledge a profound change in the ¡°deep structure¡± of capitalism. Technological change, which in the past has contributed so much to the dynamism of capitalism development, no longer does so. The need for extreme monetary policies in the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2007¨C2009, the failure of these policies, and the lack of plausible alternatives to them, are all symptoms of an underlying disease beyond cure. A path towards a democratic form of socialism must be forged for the simple yet compelling reason Rosa Luxemburg articulated: it is a matter of socialism or barbarism.

We are facing a terrifying moment in human history, but also a miraculous moment. At the very time when climate change threatens our species with extinction, we not only know that we face an existential threat, we have the means not only to avert catastrophe, but to provide virtually everybody on our planet with the material means for decent life. This paper asks, and attempts to answer, a series of questions: Why are we not doing what needs to be done? Is there a viable alternative to our current economic order? What then should I do?

In recent decades, the literature of global ethics has promoted greater and more rigorous attention to transnational moral responsibilities. This essay argues, however, that prominent global-ethics anthologies remain burdened by Eurocentric/colonialist elements that contradict efforts to build more ethical transnational communities. Drawing on scholars of coloniality, including Enrique Dussel, Anibal Quijano, and Linda Tuhiwai Smith, the essay traces colonialist elements in deep structures of prominent global ethics texts. It examines how, even when texts argue for aid to the poor, these elements foster tendencies in the affluent world to detach from and dehumanize people on the other side of global hierarchies. They also deprive academic readers of the insights of grassroots global-justice struggles. The essay concludes by sketching some directions that those of us who study and teach global ethics might pursue in order to unsettle colonialist baggage and cultivate skills and relationships more conducive to ethical global communities.